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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUOTIOR 
The purpose or this theais is to study the usages of virtus 
in tbe writings ot saint Thomas Aquinas and to discover, if pos-
sible, a oentral meaning. That Aquinas uses virtue in manifold 
senses is an obvious taot. For instance, b.e speaks ot intel16c-
tual and moral virtues, habitual dispositions ot mind and vill. l 
Also 1\e refe);'s to both agent and possible intellect u virtues.2 
~ben be discusses tbe relationship between elements and the cam-
pound they torm, h.e maintains that the tormer are virtually pres-
ent 1n the latter.3 Oertainly the word virtus 1s not being used 
in exactly the same manner tor all the above usagos. Yet is 
there a common thread whioh. links all these uses together? The 
quest ot suoh a oommunit,. ot meaning 1s the goal ot tbis study. 
The purpose ot the present endeavor will be Clarified by a 
briet statement of what it is not. It is not a study ot the moral 
virtues in Saint T1\omas, 1t will devote SOMe attention to their 
investigation, but the speoific nature of moral virtue 1s ~orelgn 
13.'1'., I-II. 51-58. 
-- ... 2 ~.Q •• II, 11, N. 1581, ed. Mariett! 
Jne Mut. !!!!., 5. 
1 
2 
to the present intentions. Nor will this paper examine the vir-
tues of active and passive potencies in any more detail than is 
required to understand the general notion of virtue. The core 
meaning ot virtus throughout all its usages is the objective. 
It might be objected that the scope or tne thesis is so 
general that its value is minimal. Tn. value of this study is 
twotold. First, the discovery ot a central meaning tor virtu~ 
will cast abundant light on the particular usages ot the term. 
and the importance ot the particular usages in tbe writings of 
Saint Tbomas is undeniable. Secondly, tnere 1s a general value 
to be derived trom &Dr studY' of the writings of Aquinas. An ex-
cellent way in which to oome to know the mind of tbe Angelic 
Doctor is to study some specitic concept in his work. In order 
to grasp full,. the meaning of the particular notion, it is neces-
sary to come to grips with the whole or at least a large portion 
ot his philosopbical system, 
This study sets as its objective an understanding ot virtus. 
et tbe attainment of such an understanding must be by a cumula-
ive proce.s. In the next Chapter, attention will be directed to 
text otpI'imary importanoe in this study, the tirst article of' 
be De Virtutlbus in Communi. Then a number of passages parallel 
_. .. ·_ ....... oiiooiioioI ............. 
o the tocal text will be examined. These passages will be 
tudied in their histoI'ical order. Perhaps some genesis ot the 
sanins or virtu8 in the mind ot Saint Thomas will be observed. 
Ithougb this study will not specifically investigate the his-
3 
torical development. After perusal ot tne central and parallel 
texts, 1t will be obvious tbat numerous meanings have not been 
treated. For example, virtus Signifying angel is a trequent 
usage ot the term D1 Saint Thomas.4 These additional uses will 
be discussed in a separate chapter. In a tinal chapter, the 
findings tram tbe body ot the thesis will be drawn together and 
some special questions raised in the course ot development will 
be subjected to sorutiny. 
This study labora under a peculiar ditfioulty. It is, in a 
sense, a first ot its kind. Various studies bave been made into 
the meaning ot particular types ot virtue,> especially virtue in 
the moral sense. Ho studies, however, have sought a general mean-
ing tor all the usages ot virtus. As a consequence, there can be 
little recourse to secondal7 sources tor assistance. 
The laok of dire4t commentary on the subject under examina-
tion oan be remedied in three ways. First, Saint Thomas himself 
can be summoned to explain what he meant in a oertain passage br 
what he wrote elsewhere. Seoondly, a tew ot the studies on par-
ticular types ot virtus will be useful. A number ot articles are 
4£.i., III, 80, n. 2.$56, ed. Marietti. 
SVernon J. Bourke, "The Role of Habitus in the Thomistic 
Metaphysics ot Potency and Aot," Essays in Thomism, Ed. Robert 
E. Brennan, O.P. (New York: Sheea and Vira, l~J. PP. 101-10 & 
370-73 J Luke J. Lindon, S.O. J., "Irhe Significance ot tbe Te:rm 
\'lrtus Natural!s in the Moral Pb.ilosophy ot st. Thomas Aquina.s," 
Jroceedln,s ot: 'Ehe American Catholic Philosopil1cal Association, 
5tXXI (19$ j, PP7"1'7-164: R.or! Renard, S.J., "ftie HaS!ts In 'E&e 
System ot St. Thomas," Gregorianum, XXI~ (1948), Pl'. 88-111. 
4 
available on partioular passages whioh will be studied in detall.6 
Thirdly, a number of lexioons, in spite of the taot that they 
only catalogue the many uses ot virtue and do not seek any general 
meaning, will taoilitate this work.? 
6Thomas Aquinas, Saint, Summa Theologioa, Ed. Heinrioh 
Maria Ohristman, O.p. (Salzburg: Anton 'Pustet, 1940), XI, PP • 
.$.30-.32; Aquinas, Tb.eiJirtues, Tr. John Patriok aei4, O.P. 
(Providenoe: ProVIaenoe 601l8ge Press, 1951), PP. ix-xxvii & 1-8, 
M. Pierro_, "Un article de S. Thomas sur 1& vertu," Bulletin 
Joseph totte, VI (19.35), pp. 406-14. 
7R01 J. Deterrari, A Lat1n-~lish Diotionar.l of St. Thomas 
Ag,uinas (Boaton: Daughters ot St"au1, 1(60), pp. E89-97, 
neferrari & 81ster M. Inviolata Barry, O.D.P., A Lexioon ot Saint 
Tbomas Agulnas {Vasbington: Catholic University of America Press, 
1~48J, Pp. 1!59-67; Ludwig Sohutz, Thomas-Lexikon, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Masurgia Publisbers, n.d.), pp. 8;2:&5: Pete".. ot Bergamo, 
o. P., In ?Ber~ Saneti Tbomae Aguinat18 seu Tabula Aurea Eximii 
DootorIi 0 .. : maltion8s Paullnae, n.~, pp. 994-16aS. 
CHAPTER II 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE OENTRAL TEXT: DE VIRTUTISUS IN COMMUNI, 1 
- -
At the beginning ot this discussion, soma justif1cation 
might be required tor beginning with the J2!. Virtutibus !!! Oommuni. 
article 1. It is, as indicated by the chapter heading, the cen-
tral text in this disoussion ot virtus in tbe writings of Saint 
Thomas Aquinas. At first, the reader might be inclined to think 
that the title, De Virtutibu8 in Oommuni, is sufficient justifi-
- -
oation in itselt. The title could be interpreted as signifying 
that this disputed question is an attempt on the part otAquinas 
to collect into one treatise the manitold usages of virtus and to 
explore what community exists among them. 
Suoh, nowever, is not the case. As will appear, the !!!. Vir-
tutibul !n .C.omm ___ un .. i is a discuss10n by Saint Thomas of the comma-
nit,. among not all tne usages ot virtua, but ot one partioular 
type, virtus as hab! t¥.!. Why then should this disputed question 
be of interest to a discussion of the central notion of v1rtus? 
In the first article of the question, Saint Thomas renders probab-
ly his clearest exposition or a central meaning tor the term.!it-
~ and gives his most extensive classification ot the various 
types ot virtues. Research on virtus in the writings of Saint 
Thomas baa, therefore, revealed this article to be tlle most suit-
6 
able point of referenoe in tne discussion. 
In order to situate the reader in the context of the article 
under consideration, it will be helpful to state in general now 
the B! Virtutibus !n .e.o.Mm.-un .. i develops. Fatner Patrick Reid gives 
tne following outline of the question.1 Tbe first two articles 
concern the nature of virtue. Article. 3-7 explore the subjects 
of virtue. In articles 8-10, the anal,sis shitts to the erfi-
oient cause of virtue. The tinal three articles, 11-13, treat of 
tbe properties and distinction ot virtues. As mentioned above, 
the subjeot matter ot the question enoompasses the usages ot 
virtus as babitus, such as the intellectual, moral, and theolo-
gioal virtues. I t treats the central detini tion and tne princi-
pal usages of virtus only as preliminary to its studl ot the vir-
tues wbicb are habits. 
The subject ot the present chapter is tbe first article of 
~ Virtutibus !e Oommuni or the first halt ot Aquinas's discussion 
ot tbe nature ot virtue. The following article is a commentary 
on a detinition of virtue by St. Augustine. It is not ot impor-
tance to this discussion. 
Besides the general development, another point should be 
The De Vlrtutibus in Oommuni is a late work ot Saint 
- - ----............. 
Its exact dates are not of oritioal importanoe in this 
discussion, but it can be satel, placed among his writings between 
IThamaa Aquinas, Saint, The Virtues, trans. John Patrick 
Reid, O.F. (Providence: Provlaence dollege Press, 19>1), p. xxix. 
1 
1269 and 1212.2 It represents a work of the mature Thomas and, 
along with the parallel passagea in the Summa, constitutes a much 
clearer exposition ot virtus than can be found in the earlier 
works. 
Before to~al study ot the text, it will be helpful to ex-
plain the methodology here employed. The general procedure will 
be to present passages trom the first article of the J2! Virtutibus 
in Communi and in a tow paragraphs to attempt an explication ot 
.........., . , 
the text. In one instance, it will be necessary to interrupt the 
general procedure to investigate the meaning ot an important deti-
nition of virtus given bl Saint Thomas. The guide, however, in 
this investigation will be Saint Thomas himselt b1 means ot tur-
th.er texts to whioh he refers the reader of the De Virtutibus in 
- -
Communi, 1. Also in commenting on a classitioation of the vir-
tues given in the article, th.e work ot Vernon Bourke on tb.e same 
subject will be ot assiatance.3 At the olose of the chapter, 
2 ftCritical authorities disagree to some extent as regards 
the date ot composition ot th.ese five Questions on the virtues 
/De Virtutibu8 in Communi, De Caritatej bi (!orrectione Fraterna, 15e~, and 15e lIrtutlbua O'ird{;X\;fi .-TEii, are, at beat, 
unan mOU8 in-asslgning all tlveo. fhamaata second sta, in 
PariS, between the ,ears 1269-12. Srnave and Grabmann indicate 
this three year period as the time of composition. Pere Mandonnet 
narrows the span to the ,ears 1210-1212. Final1" Van Steen-
berghen and others would date tbese Questions some time after the 
De Malo, which the, hold was written during the lears 1211-1212. 
ra iri'"""content, tor pre.ent purposes, to acoept the date more 
commonl, agreed on, 1269-1212, when st. Thomas taught at Paris 
tor the second time." Ibid., p. xvi. 
-
)aourke, pp. 101-109. 
8 
there will be a brief review ot tbe tentative conclusiona whicn 
this article contributes to an understanding of ttle term virtue 
in tne writings ot Saint Thomas plus some questiona which sbould 
guide tne di.cu.sion in tne remaining chapters of tn1s tnesis. 
Tbe title of tne R! Virtutibus !! Co.-uni, 1 is -Utrum Vir-
tutes Sint Habitus." It .bould be noted that virtutes in tnts 
context reters to tne intellectual, moral, and tn-ologieal vir-
tues. In tbe bodT ot the article, Saint Tbomas admit. tbat tnet-e 
are valid usage. or tbe term vit-tus which. do not signify habit., 
Tet replies to the ot-iginal question ot tbe article in tbe aftir-
mative. ae would be contradioting bias.lt unl •••• in posing the 
question, be understood vit-tute. to reter only to tbe .intellectu-
al, moral, and tbeological virtues. 
Tbe boa, ot article 1, Wbieb i. tbe .ubjeot matter tor thi. 
cbapter, i. divided into three parts. The tirst section treats ot 
the detinition. ot virtue, some nominal, and others essential. 
In the second aeetion, virtues are classified according to tbe 
various types of operative potencies. Pinall" in a concluding 
section, a determination is made tbat virtu.s are nabit.. Tbe 
general movement ot the pasaage is hom tne notion ot virtu. in 
general to one partioular u.age. 8inoe the tirst two .eotions 
oonoern tbe general notion ot virtu., they will be of primary 
importanoe in tbe present chapter. 
At tbe begiuning ot tbe corpus, Saint 'l'boll8.. explains the 
noainal definition of virtus: 
9 
Virtus, secundum sui nominis rationem, potentiae complemen-
tum designat; unde at vis dieitur, secundum quod res aliqua 
per potestatem eompletam quam habet, poteat sequi suum im-
petum vel motum. Virtue enim, secundum suum nomen, potes-
tatis perfectione. demonstratJ unde rhilosophus dicit in 14 
Caelf .!! Mundi, quod virtus est ultimum in re de potentia. 
!!rtus has two nominal detirlitions. Tne first is "potentiae com-
plementum" or "fulfillment ot a potency." For this reason, it is 
called a via since vis designates a power complete to the extent 
- -
that it enables its possessor to act ot its own initiative. The 
second nominal definition ot virtus i8 "potestatis perfection or 
"actuation of a power." Aristotle referred to this when he said 
tbat virtu. was tn. "ultil'l'lWl 1n r. de potentia" or the tllimit ot 
a th.ing's power" in the first book ot the De aaelo.S A thing 1s 
-..;;,,;;;;;.;;..;;. ... 
limited in its activit,.. in so tar as the activation of the power 
by which it acta is limited. 
From the nominal definition, Saint Thomas proceeds to the 
essential detinition ot the term: 
Quia vero potentia ad actum dicitur, complementum potentiae 
attenditur penes hoe quod completam operationem sueipit. Quia vero operatio est tinis operantis, cum omnis res, 
secundum Philosophum in I Caeli et Mundi, sit propter suam 
operationem, siout propter IInem-Proilmum; unumquodque est 
bonum, secundum qu.od habet oompletum ordinem ad suum tinem. 
Inde est quod virtus bonum raoit nabentem, et opus .jus 
reddit bonum, ut dicitur in II Ethio.; et per buno etiam 
modum patet quod est dispositio perlecti ad optimum, ut 
dicitur in VII Metaeh.6 
4De Vir. in Oom., 1 cJ the reference to Aristotle within the 
quotation 18: R! dael., I, 11, 281a, lS. 
50& Cael., I, 11, 2914, 15. 
--
6De !!!. !e ~., 1 c; tne reterences to Aristotle within 
10 
The struoture of the argumentation is as follows: since poten-
eies are designated accoI'ding to their aets, the fulfillment of a 
potency sif!."Uii'ies the oapability to undertake an operation in its 
fullness; sinoe operation is the purpose of the operant and ever1'-
thing possesses its peouliar type ot operation as its proximate 
end, a thing may be said to be good inasmuch as it is totally 
ordered to that end; coupling these two notions, that a thing is 
good in 80 far as it is ordered to its end and that virtue orders 
a thing to its proximate end, Saint Thomas formulates two defi-
nitions of virtue: (1) it is what "bonum facit habentem at opus 
ejus roddit bonum" and (2) it is a "disposltio pertectt ad opti-
_~_ ft 
... -. 
rhe rlrst definition, "makes the possessor good and renders 
its aotivity good," specifies the effects tnat virtue achiev.s in 
its subject. frhe ~Go<Jnd de>finition l:itatss directly what virtua 
is. As a consequenoe, it will be of greater importance to this 
study. 
At this point, the essential definition of virtus as !y-sRo-
sitio Eer.t'ecti !& oRtimum must be examined in detail. It will 
proba.bly faoilitate understanding to examine the terms severally. 
Three terms are significant: d1spcsitio, perteoti, and o:etimum. 
Although. a complete understanding of these terms is not 'to be 
expected at this point, some grasp is neoessary for the subsequent 
11 
development of' this thesis. Within the scope ot Article 1 of De 
-
~ in 99Jf111?Jli , some explanation can be found, and that is 
the object of the present endeavor. 
In the repl,. to tho ninth difficulty of Article 1, Saint 
Thomas explains what he means by d1s2281t10: 
D18positio dicitUl" trlbu8 t~d1!. Uno modo POl' quam materia 
di8POnitur ad tormae reoep onem, slout calor est dispoal. 
tio. ad formam ignis. Ati~ modo per quam. ali quod agens dis. 
pon1 tur ad agendum, sicu ve too ! tas est diapos! tio ad cur ... 
sum. Tertio modo dispoaitl0 dicit-w:- ipsa ord1natio ali ... 
quorum a(l Iiiylcem, at hoe modo diapositio ab Augustino 
sumitur. Dispos1tio vero contra bab1tum dividitur primo 
modoJ ipsa v&ro virtua, diapositio est secundo modo."( 
D1sposlt10 is used in the second· sense as "per quam agens dlspo-
n1tur ad agendum." V1rtus 1s a 4182os1t10 beoause it is that by 
which a th1ngli.s;;1"'eadied tor activit,.. Yet, what i8 that bY' means 
ot which a thing acta? It is a tON. Tb.ua tne d18P081tio is a 
formal determination ot an agent in order tna.t it may aot. 
What doea tlle perfeoti add ~o the definition? Sinoe tbe 
phrase is diapositl0 pt!rtecti, the reasonable co.nclusio.n would be 
that R!rtecti reters to tbe subject o.t the formal determination. 
Pertect"!! ox-dinaril,. means that which. has act, and pertect\, here 
designate. what has been actuated 07 the 41.p08itio. In the bo.d1 
ot tbe firat artiole ot De V1rtutib~ !!! O~it Saint Tb.omaa 
referred to. the fellowing passage from tbe seventn beok of bia 
Ooaaentm S the Pht.loa,a as the aouroe ot n1a definition of 
7l2.t .n.t. !!! ,ggm., 1 ad 9. 
8Tbe quotation above (p. 9, 
ettl edition .. reada "VII MetaDn .. 
cit. 6), tram tbe eighth Marl-
Tnis readinSl! i8 olearly inoor-
12 
virtus aEi disposltl0 perfecti a~ optimum. In that passage. Saint 
Thomas explains more ampl1 tne meaning of perfect1: 
Quia tunc est aliquld maxima secundum naturam, quando natu-
rae virtutem nabet; virtu. enim naturae est signum oomple-
tionis natUl'lae, cum aut em aliquld habet oomplete suam na-
turam, tune dicitur esse pertectum. Quod non solum in re-
bus naturalibus verum est, sed etiam in matbematicis, ut 
sorum forma accipiatur pro eorum natura~ tune anim maxime 
circulus est" idest pertectus oirculus, quando ms.ximi est 
secunaum natur~" idest quando habet perfection •• suae---
formae. 
Sio el'lgo patet, quod cum ad perfeotionem formae, eu-
ju.slibet rei oonsequatur virtue ejus, quod tunc unumquodqua 
perteotum est, quando babet suam virtutem. Et ita sequitur 
quod virtue sit perfectio quaedam*9 
Vir~~, it 1s argued, is the sign ot a complete nature. Whatever 
has a complete nature is perfeot; Thus that whioh possesses vir-
-
.E:!!. may be said to be perfeot. Thus the term R!rfeoti in the def-
inition refers to a nature or power whioh is complete or, it might 
be added, formally determined by a d182ositio. 
optimum, the remaining term in the definition, remains to be 
explained. In the following passage, whioh. is taken from the com-
mentary on the ~ntsie~, and to which he referred in ~ Virtutibus 
!!! Q..ommuni, 1 c. Saint Thomas indicates what the o;etimum in the 
definition signifies: 
Hujusmodi enim sunt qua.dam dispositiones ejus quod est per-
tectum in sua natura per oomparatione. !! o2timum, idest ad 
reet. It should read "VII PhfS." In the seventh Marietti edi. 
tion, the error was eorrected in a parenthesis immediatel,. tollow-
ing the reference to the seventh book of the Metaehlsios. Reid, 
in his translation of tne treatise on the vi:r£ues in general, 
makes reference to the Phlsios. 
9In VII Ph;z:s., 6, nn. 1860-61. 
13 
tinem« qui est operatio! Siout enj~ dictum est, ex hoe hu. jusmQai dispositionea v rtutea dicuntu~J quod bonum faciunt 
b.9.bentem. at opus e jus bonum :reddunt. Dlcuntur e~go h.ujua-
modi dispositiones pe~ relationem ad debitum opus, quod est 
optimum rei. . 
Nee oportet exponare optimum, aliquld extrinseeum, 
siout quod est pulcherrimum aut san1ss~, ut Commentator 
exponit: accidlt enim pulcbritudini et sanitat1 relatl0 
quae est ad extrinseeum optime dispositumte sed per se com-
petit eis relatio quae est ad bonum opus. 0 
The first part ot the passage 1s a review ot the ground already 
oovered. Virtutes are the dispositiones ot whatever is Eerteetum 
in its nature by oomparison to the optimum which. is its natural 
end or operation. Thus the op;1mum reters to operation or second 
act. Optimum, as indicated in the tinal sentence ot the first 
paragraph, is the debitum oRus which 1s the -greatest good- the 
potency can acquire. In tbe next pa~aph, Saint Thomas 1n~ 
structs his readers that oatimum does not reter to anything ex-
trinsic to the potencl pos.essing virtue. The oRt1mum doe. not 
dssignate a measure ot goodness outside the subjeot. It desig-
nates rathe~ something intrinsio to the subject potencl, namely 
the taot that the potenoT is formally determined to a speoific 
operation. 
In review, then, what does 41sRos1tio pertecti !S oRt±!!! 
mean? The dispositio indicates what virtus directly signities, 
viz., a tormal determination. The 2erteoti represents the sub-
ject of this formal determination, an operative potencT. The 
oPtimum 1s second act or the aotlvitT to which the potencT by 
l0lg VII PhIS., $, nne 1853-54. 
means of' the formal determination attaint:. Dispositio l?erfectl 
!.4 oetimum lT1S.7 be translated as "the formal determination of an 
operative potency to ita proper activity." Such is the central 
definition of virtus according to Saint Thomas Aquinas. 
In the second section ot the body of Article 1, Saint Thoma. 
classities the different types of virtue. This classification ls 
ot importance to tnis stud7 alnee 1t reveals what usages ot !!£-
tus Saint Thomas understands as derived from the general meaning 
-
of the term defined as dispositl0 perieeti !! optimum.11 
The division of virtu! into its various types is, Saint Tho-
mas states. "secundum autem dlve~sam conditionem potentiarum. u12 
There are tb:r>ee t,-pes ot operative potencies: totallY' active. 
purely passiVe, and partiallY' aotive. partial17 passive. Accord-
ing to these three types ot potencies, there are tbr.. types ot 
.!.!.~tu •• 
The tirst t;rpe ot virtu. is that or tbe total17 active 
potencies: 
Potentia 19itur quae eet tantum a'In" non indiget, ad hoc 
quod sit principlum actus. arlquo n ucto, unde virtue talis 
potentiae nihil est aliud quam lpsa potentia. Talis autem 
potentia est divtna, lntellectus agena. et potentlae natu-
rales: unde harum potentiarum virtutes non aunt aliqui habi-
tus. sed lpsa. potentiae in aeipsis complatae.l ) 
llot some assistance in the subsequent analyses of text will 
be the work or Vernon Bourke on this subject. 
12:oe !!!:. !!! .2.2!., 1 c. 
13Ibld. 
-
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In the active potencies, the virtus 1s "ipsa potentia in se ipsa 
completa." The potenc," itself is a virtue. Of '.ts very nature 
it 1s fomally determined to its proper aotlYity. Examples ot 
such potencies are th.e divine power, ttl.a agent intellect, and the 
natural potencies. None of these require an efficient causo in 
order to act. or themselves they are tully determined to acnieve 
their operation without etficient oausality on the part ot their 
objects., 11+ 
A seoond type ot virtue can be found among tbe purely pas-
sive potencies: 
111a8 vero potentiae sunt tantum aetas quae non agunt nisi 
alii8 motae, nec est in ela agere vel non agers, sed secun-
dum impetum virtutls moventi. agunt: .et tales sunt vires 
sensitivae secundum se considerata.; unde in III Ethic. 
dicitur, quod sensus nullius aotus est pr1ncip1um: at hae 
potentiae perticiuntur ad suos actus per aliquid super1n-
duo tum; quod tamen non inest 8is sicut ali qua forma manena 
in subjecto, sed solum per modna passionis, siout species 
in pupilla. Unde nee harum potentiarum virtutes sunt habi-
tus, sed magis ipsae potentiae, secundum quod 8unt actu 
passa. a suis aetivis.15 
The type ot potency here illustrated doos not act ot its own 
power but only under the influence ot an etticient cause. Exam-
~nHe begins by describing three ditferent kinds ot opera-
tive potencies. TOe tirst 1£1 wholly active in ita original state, 
it requires, and oan have, nothing added to it to bring it to the 
apex ot ita power. It ia a virtus beoause its potenoy ia meta-
physioally complete within its species. Examples ot this type ot 
wholly aotive potency are: the divine potenoy. the agent intel-
lect, and physical torces. There can be no question ot tne devel-
opment ot habitus in these potenele~, beoause they are metapn,si-
cally perfect in their original eond1tions. ft Bourke, p. 104. 
l$De Vir. in Com., 1 c, the reference to Aristotle within 
the quotation 1s: pIc. m., VI, 2, 1139&, 20. 
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ples ot such. potencies are the sense powera. The taculty of 
sight, tor instance, does not operate except when stimulated to 
do so by its proper object or etficient oause, color. 
In suoh. potencies, what constitutes their virtus? Even 
though senae powers are purely passive potencies, their aotivit,. 
is immanent. Thus alttlougb. they require anattioient oause to 
aot, the aotivity must also be explained intrinsioall,.. The 
intrinsic explanation ot sense aotivity is the virtus or tormal 
determination to a speoifio aot of sensing. This is what Saint 
Thomas strives to point out when be sa,.s that the virtus of these 
purely passive potencies i8 "ipsa potentia aotu passa a suis aoti-
via." The virtus is "the potenol itself while aotually being 
determined by the objects to act." This is the second type of 
virtus: the formal determination of a purely passive potency to 
its prasent operation.16 
The third type ot virtu~ is desoribed b,. Saint Tbcmas in 
the following passage: 
Potentia. vero illae sunt agentes !! acta~ quae ita moventur 
... 
l6nA seoond kind of operative potencl is wholly passive. it 
does not aot unless actuated by an active potenc1. This sort of 
passive potenoy is perfected for the action proper to it b,. the 
advent ot a quality Which is present onlr during the time ot 
actual operation. This quality is called a passion and it does 
not belong to the same apecies of quality aa habitus. Sinoe 
these passions do not remain in the passive potency after tbe 
actual operation has oeased, there ia no posslbil.ity of metapills-
ieal development in these wholly passive potencies. Tile sens. 
powers (oonsidered simply in themselves without rational oontrol) 
belong to this second type ot wholl.,. passive potency, in which. no 
habitus formation is found." Bourke, P. 104. 
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a suis activis, quod tamen per eas non dete~minantur ad 
unum; sad in eis est agare, siout vires aliquo modo ratio-
nales; at hae potentiae camplentur ad agendum per aliquid 
superinductum, quod non est in els per modum passionis tan-
tum, sed per modum formae quiescentis, at manentis in sub-
.jecto, lta tamen quod per eas non de necessitate potentia 
ad unum cogaturJ quia slc potentia non esset domina sui 
actus. Harum potentiarum virtute. non sunt ipsae poten-
tiae; neque passiones, sicut est in sensitivis potent!!s, 
neque qualitstes de necessitate agente., sicut sunt quali-
tates rerum naturalium. sed sunt habitus, secundum quos 
potest quis agere cum voluerit ut dicit Oommentator in III 
de Anima. Et Augustinus in lib. de Bono OonJugali dicit, 
quod 6i6itus est quo quis agit, cum tempus alruerit.11 
Potencies 01' the third type are the habituated potencies. They 
are partiallY' passive. To act the,. require an efficient cause. 
They are also partiall,. active. The complete explanation 01' their 
activity, bowevet-, is not tbe erticient cause alone. Fot- example, 
the possible intellect can be a habituated potency. To explain 
an act ot knowledge, recourse must be had to ertioient oauses, 
the agent intellect and a phantasm. To explain tully, however, 
human understanding, consideration must be given all 1ts factors, 
among them the tamiliar pb.enomenon that new knowledge ill assimi-
lated to the old. This phenomenon sllows that the possible intel-
lect i. partial17 active in it. opet-ation, inasmuch as previousl7 
acquired knowledge detet-m1.nes the reception ot the new. To 
explain why these powers assimilate the new acoording to the old 
17ne Vit-. in Oom., 1 CJ the t-ererenoes to Averroes and 
Augustlne-wYiEin~hj quotation are the following: Avert-cas, 
Commentu1um MaseUlD in Aristotelis De Anima Libros, ed. F. Stuat-t 
Crawtot-d, {~orpus ~o;;entaI-Iorum lverrois In Xiistotelem, Vol. VI) (Oambridge, Rass.: MedIeval Icadem,. or Imirica, tq;j), p. 438, 
Ausustin, Saint, Oeuwes de Saint A!!s'ystin, Vol. II : Prob1emes 
Moraux, ed~_Gustave dom.Se;-(Pat-ls: ~sclee de Brouwet- et die, 
IQU!'1) n au 
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requires something intrinsic. This something intrinsic which 
determines the operations, is the third type of virtus. 
The virtus ot the habituated potencies is the habit itselt. 
It is a "forma manens in subjecto. It Habits are tormal detel'mina-· 
tions ot an operative potency which, along with the etticient 
cause, determine the subsequent activity of the subject power.18 
At this point in the tirst article ot the De Virtutibus in 
--- - ...... 
Communi, Saint Thomas turns his attention to explaining in what 
sense virtues are habits. Since the article trom this point 
onward (the question also) deals with some particular types ot 
virtus, it is no longer ot interest to this general study. 
In retrospect, what bas the analysis of' the B! Virtutibus 
in Communi, article 1, revealed tor this study ot the general 
notion ot virtue in the writings ot Saint Thomas Aquinas? First, 
it has revealed a central definition: disRositio perfect! ~ 
18"1t is on11 when we come to the third kind ot operative 
potency that the possibility, and need, ot habitus is found. 
These last potencies are a sort of metaphysical .candal; they are 
of a nature which seems to go beyond the limit. ot the simple 
theory of potency and act. They are at once active and passive, 
agentes et actae. It is true that they must be actuated bY' thetXt 
corresponding active potencie., but this actuation does not, as 
in the ease of wholl,. passive poteneies, determine t!:lam to one, 
and only one, sort of operation. Even under the influenee of 
active potene1. tbe.e powers retain, witbin well-defined limit., 
their ability to oontrol their own ope.ations. Wnat is produced 
in these potenCies, under the aetuation of aetive potency, is not 
met-ely a passion but a quality, of th.e nature ot a form, which 
remains after the period of aetuation has ceased. The rational 
powers of man are examples ot potenCies which can be tnus meta-
physically developed, or brought to the condition of virtua, oy 
the growth. of acquired qualities which are called habitus." 
Bourtke, p. 104. 
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optimum. Virtus is "the formal detePmination ot an operative 
potency to its proper activity." The dispositio indicates what 
virtue direotly is, a formal determination. Perf'ecti indicates 
.. 
the subject of virtue, an operative potency which is perfected or 
receives f'irst act by means of the 4.isposltl0. The optimum indi-
oates the proper operation of the power, the second aot which the 
~is:eositio enables the operative patenc,. to perf'orm. 
Secondly. the analysis has revealed a classification of' 
types ot virtu. by Saint Thomas. There are three types. There 
is the virtus ot the active potenoies such as the divine power, 
agent intellect, and the natural potencies. Tna virtus of such 
potencies consists in the powers themselves which are fUlly deter-
mined to act. The second type of' virtue is tound in the purely 
passive potencies such as sense faoulties. The virtue of' such 
potencies is the potency itself when actually being determined by 
its objeot to act. The tinal type of virtus is found in the habi-
tuated potenoies such as will and intellect, acting under ttle 
influence of' moral and intellectual habits. The virtus of such 
potenCies is the habit which, along with the efficient cause, 
detep,mines the power to act. 
There are likewise some questions that remain for develop-
ment. By questions for development is meant questions which 
should guide the inquiry of' the remaining chapters of this thesis. 
They are qu.estions raised during the examination of the 12! Virtu-
tibus in Communi, article 1, which should be answered if the 
-
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meaning of virtus in the writings of Saint Thomas is to be ade-
qua,tely grasped. 
R.egarding the central definition, two questions arise. 
lirat, is it actually a central ddfinition? Since it is round 
in a treatise conoerning the theologioal, intellectual, and moral 
virtues, 1s it perhaps a definition of virtus as habit rather 
than of virtus in genaral? Seoondly, it was presu.'11ed that virtua 
and its definition can be restricted to operative potencies. In 
the further study of Saint Thoma.e~s writings, nowever, will it 
appear that he uses the term virtus in oonnection with potenoies 
which are not operatiVe? 
There were three important terms in the oentral definition 
of vir:tus: d\seositio, 2erfeo",~, optimum. In the context of th.e 
B! Virtutibus 1a. Communi, article 1, an attempt was made to 
ola.rify' the meaning of those terms. Subsequent inquiries should 
focus on further clarifying their meaning. 
Three usages or virtue were indicated in the article studied 
the viI-tus of active potenCies, that of purely passive potencies, 
and that or habituated potenoies. Are there other usages of vir-
-
tus not mentioned in the central text and what are they? Are the 
-
usages mentioned here the most important and are there other 
important usages to be disoovered? 
A final question for development regards the context in 
which the central definition and these three usages were vnoov-
ered. They were found in a oontext of a discussion of the virtue. 
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which are habits. Does this indicate a certain primacy in the 
mind ot Saint Thomas to be attributed to the moral and intelleo-
tual virtues? Does this indio ate that virtus as a habit is a 
sort ot prime analogate and that all the other usages are secon-
dary? Such are the prinoipal questions raised by the study ot the 
present chapter. It remains tor tn. subsequent chapters to indi-
cate the answers. 
CHAPTER III 
A STUDY OF PARALLBL TEXTS 
Tbi. ob.aptep wl11 conala' 1n a .tud7 ot tb.e papaUel text. 
to .2!. Vlrtutibu! !a OOJDNn!. 1. Tb.el'8 are five pa.8age. tbat 
tOrm talrl1 010.e parallels top the oentral text ot thi. disous-
sion.1 The.e are, the Iw.a Tbeolo&.\ae, I-II, SSt 1, the .eoond 
book ot the O!,!!nt!£l on tbe Sentenoe., 27. 1, 11 tbe third book 
ot the .8lI8 work, 23, 1, 3. sol. 1 and 3, tbe .eoond book of tbe 
OOlll1l8nta£l ~Jl !!!! Ethiq, •• leotU" S. . 
In tbi. obapter, the ~.l1el text. wl11 be exua1ne4 in 
thelp chPonolo,lcal order. The.R! Veri tate, 14. 3 and Sw.a 
Theololl .. , I-II, 71, 1 vill also be .tuelied, eftn though tbe,. 
are not euotlJ' parallel, s1Me the,. oontaln Uacus.iona apop-
tant to aD uadepstand1na ot tbe .eneral notion ot vlrtue acoor4-
PI 
1118 to Sain' Thomaa. 
The _tho4 ..,l078d wl11 be the .ame aa lntbe prevloWi 
chapter. Paa.age. trOll tbe wrltings ot Aquina. will be 01'e4 and 
explioated, alone vitb. comments on tbelr alga1tloance top tbe 
pre.ent stuq. The oonolucl1q p8.I'8gIIapba wl11 oonslder hoW the 
quatioDS top 4evelopment posed in Ohapter Two have been 
lAs 11sted in Sa1nt Thomas Aquinaa, SSa.,t10n.~ D&'eSt.!a •• 
8th ed. (Turint Harlettl, 1949), II, P. 7~7. 
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olarified in tbe present chapter. Likewi.e anJ further ques-
tiona raised bJ this chapter will be treated. 
The firat thr •• parallel text8. wbicb will be 8tudied as a 
unit, aN trOll tbe Oommentul .2!! 19!. Sentenc... Tbel constitute 
Saint TbOJIas' S .&1'1188t expre8sion2 of b.1s ideas on tbe general 
notion ot virtue. The tirat text 18 found In Book II, Dist1notion 
21, question 1, artlcle 1. Tbe general context of the article 1. 
a trea-"nt ot grace. The .pecltio question ot this artiole ls 
"Utrua .1rhe alt babltu." 
!be eolutl0 reada. 
Oum .tteotua propo:rtionetur auae oa118u, oportet aotna po-
tentia. ratlonal18 Ip.! potentiae proportlOD&tua ••••• In 
acn aute. virtutl. non aol_ oonslderatv sub.tantia Ipaiua 
aotWl, sed etiam modus a8endi. non en1m qui casta operttur 
q1100uaque m040 castu eat. sed qul faoiliter et deleotaol1i-
tel" • • •• Deleotatl0 autem ex oonvenientla oausatur, 
siout et in aenaibil1bua pate' quod oonJunc'io oonveni.ntis 
cum conv.ntenti tacit de lee tatl on... Oport., ergo quod 
actus virtutls p~.dat a potentia adaptata et assimilata 
ad nunc actum. Hoc autem pot.ntia ratlonall. non habet ex 
aeips., cua al' ad utrum11b.t. Oporte' er&o aliquid poten-
tiae superaddl, ut perteotionem eJus, per quod talem actam 
eduoa', undeo\Dlque cauaetv I et boc d101aus ea.. habi t_ 
virtutl. t at ideo 4101 t Pb.110.oplma • • • Cluod signum gene-
rati llabltua oporte' acaipere ti.nt .. in opere delectatlo-
n.m. Hinc atlam .at quod potentia perf.cta per habitum vir-
tnltis tentit 111 aotum oonalllil_ per m04wl oujua4ua natura. S 
ps-opter quod dioit Tullius ••• quod virtua eat habitua, 
modo natvae, ration! oonaentaneua, aieut en1m gravita. 
deorsu,Dl tendlt, ita oas'itas outa operatur. Hine et1am 
•• , quod in natura oample'a, euJua potentia ad malWl tl.cti 
non poteat, non requiritv habitus quo mediante agat, quia 
Ipsa potentia ex selpsa Pl'oport10Data •• , ad aetWl pert'"~~l 
arbe O~DtF. Oil tbe Senteno.. was vri tten between the 
lear. 1253 an DS7 lS'l. -...rlLi lJralimarm, !homa.a AQuina., tnna. 
Virgil Michel,O.S.a. (Ie. York:· Lonpana, Gr •• n no., 1928), 
p. 21. 
tum ut in Deo patet.) 
The tirst assertion of this passage is that, Just as every effect 
is proportioned to Its cause, so every act of a rational potency 
must be p:roportioned to the power. In an aot ot virtue (bare a 
rational act), however, two faotors MUst be considered, tne sub. 
stance ot the act and. the manner in Whioh it is plaoed. For 
example. the virtue ot chastity does not consiat merely in the 
positing ot a chaste act (substance), but in the fact that it is 
placed with facility and delight (manner). Therefore, acts ot 
human virtue cannot be explained. exclusive11 in terms of the 
rational power, but require an additional explanation, a habit. 
Thus tu the discu.sion has been confined to a particular t7Pe ot 
virtua, human virtue. 
I 
In tbe tinal sentences ot the aolution, however, Saint 
Thomas points out a parallel between tbe human and "natural ft vir-
tues. An habituated rational power tends towarda an act Which is 
quasi-natural to it. POI' example, wl11 ot ita nature is not dls-
posed to any specific type ot act. Tbe habituated wl11, however, 
is inclined to specific aots which may be said to b. quasi-natu-
ral to it. Natural potenci.s tend tow-.rds specific acts of their 
ver7 nature. Since, by nature, they are determined to these acts, 
they do not require • habit in order to be virtues. The reply to 
I. ... 
lIn II Sent •• 27, 1, 1 sol., the references to Aristotle 
witb.1n the quot.£ion are the followins: Nie. Etb.., I, 8, 1099a, " 
17-21, Ibid., II, ), 1104b, 4; the refereno; to'11ic8ro ia: Cicero, 
~_ Inveii'iIOne, II, ,~f" 159, e4. H.M. Hubbell (Oambridge, Mas". I' 
tlal'var! tr. Press. 1 'ttl. 9). J:). 327. 
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the second difficulty reiterates tbe ooncluding assertion 01" tbe 
solutio: "Potentiae naturales sunt deter:minatae ad suoaaotus ex. 
.aips!., unde non indigent babltu determinant •• siout potentiae 
rationales. quae ad utrumlibet sunt.ttl&. The tenor ot these remarks 
is that a virtue 1s wbat determines an operative potency to spe-
oific types of operation. 
In tbe repl,. to the third difficulty, an important idea ia 
added: 
Quidam dlount quod virtutes habent quosdam aotus qui oon-
tlnui sunt, neoin eis eat interpolatio, quamvla a nobis 
non sentiaturt non enb virtutes posse oti08as esse aesti-
mant, Sed aotua eat duplex: scilicet primus" ut e •• e est 
actus formae, et tali. aotu. virtutls continuua eat, 
man.nt •• nim caatitat. continu., manet •••• castum, et 
aotu •• ecundus, qui .at operatio, et nunc non contingit 
oon'binuWll e.8e J hic en1m ~ non tatum eat virtutla, aed 
potentiae quam perticitJ si!ut nulla forma quae non eat per 
ae aubsistens babet operatione. praeter oommunicationam 
subjecti, neo oontlngit aotum alique. e ••• vel operation .. 
ex libero arbltrio, et praecipue cum electione, sine qua 
viMutis aotus esae non potest, qua a nobis percipiatur.S 
The difticult7 stems .trom an asseMion that aot. ot virtue are 
oontinuous. Saint Tbomas replies witb a distinotion: aots ot 
virtue fA" continuous it oonsidered formall1. tnat is, while the 
virtue, e.g., obastit1, remains present, the aubjeot is virtuous, 
e.g., obaste, continually. It, however, acts df virtue are con-
aidered as operations, they are disoontinuous. ~hus virtues are 
considered as abiding dispositions ot·the potencies tbe7 lntOl'm, 
4Ibid., 1, ad. 2. 
Slbld., 1, ad 3. 
-
26 
and virtuous aots are oonsidered as prooeeding trom botn the vir-
tue and the pot.noT. 
Th.e other parallels in the Oommentarl .2!l !W!. Sentenoes are 
found in Book III, Distinotion 23, question 1, artiole 3. The 
first subordinate quer7 01" artiole three takes up the problem 
"Videtur quod virtute. non sint habitus sed potentiae." In the 
solutio, the tollowing &nswer i. given. 
Nomen virtuti., seoundum 8ui primam imposit10nem videtur 1n 
quamdam violentiam sonare. Unde in III Caeli et ~~di ••• 
dioitur quod mot us accidentali8, idest vloientua, e.£ qui 
est a virtute, id.st a violentia, non oum auxilio naturae. 
. Sed quia non potest aliquld alteri vl01entlam tnferre 
nial per potentiam pertectam, seoundum quam agat et non 
patiatur, lnde traotwa e8t nomen virtutia ad slgnitioandum 
omnem potentiam per1"eotam, aive qua poteat allquid ill.sip.o 
snb.istere, sive qua potest operari. Et sio dicitur 1n I 
O.eliet Mundi, quod virtua est ult1mum potentiae, quia per-
leotiopo£.ntiae mensuratur ex ultimo et maximo quod quia 
poteat. 
Et quia malum in actu oontingit ex 4e1"eotu potentiae, 
exigitur quod bene operetur in genere suo. :it propter hoc 
4icitur in II !!h., ••• quod virtua e.t quae bonum tacit 
babentem at opus ejus bonum redditJ. et in VI KhZS., ••• 
dioitur quod virtu. eat 41spositio perfeoti a optimum, 
eorum soilloet ad quae potentia se extendit. 
Et quia de virtutibus human1s 10quimurJ ideo virtus 
humane. erit6Quae particiet numanam potentia. ad actum bonum 
et optimum. 
Thi. passage ma,. be conveniently eli vided into tour parts accord-
ing to tb.e separate paragraphs. 
In tbe tirst paragraph, a nominal definition of virtus, no 
doubt based on 8. supposed etymologioal connection with!!!. is 
6In III Sent., 23, 1, 3, 801. 1, tbe references to Aris. 
totle wrihin tne-Quotation are the following: De Oael., III, i, 
301h, 18, Ibid., I, 11, 2818., 7ft., Ni<H Eth •• tr,-;;-1106a, 15-
16, .f!g!, •• nt, 3, 246b, 23. - -
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given as violent!a. Virtue and violence have this in cammont 
they both produce ohange in the object acted upon without any 
help trom the object so acted upon. Aristotle recognized this 
similarity between virtue and violence in his treatise on the 
heavens and the earth.. 
In the second paragraph, Saint Th.omas penetrates further 
into the likeness between virtue and violence. Violence can only 
be activelr inflicted by a perfected pote:pc1'. Such a potency can 
be perfected in two ways, in the order ot SUbsistence or in tha 
order ot operation. Accordingly the virtue. are divided into 
those which perfect potencies to entitative act and those which 
pertect potencies to operation. A new categorJ of virtue is 
introduced. the virtus ot potency to being. This type of virtue 
lies outside the scope ot the classification ottered in the De 
-
Vlrtutlbu8 in Oommuni. article 1,7 wbere virtus was restricted 
-
to operative potencies. 
In the following paragraph, two essential definitions are 
derived. Because any detect in operation results tram an inade-
quacy in the power, there is required something over and above the 
operative potency tor it to act. Virtue perfects the potency and 
enables it to perform second acts. Thus virtue can be essential17 
defined alternately as "tnat whicn renders a subject good and its 
operation good" or "tne disposition of a perfected power tor what 
J "n 
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is best in it." Th.ese two definitions are already familiar a.nd. 
have been explained elsewhere.8 
In this same paragraph, Saint Thomas offers a different 
reason for the use of th.e word optimum. Virtue is opposed to 
deteot, likewise the effects of each are opposed. A defect in an 
operative potencY' results in an evil, oonsequently, virtue must 
result '.n a good. The good in this case is an operative act 
tully in aooord with the finality of the potency. The use ot the 
superlative o;etimum i8 explained by the fact that the perteetion 
ot an operative potency is designated acoording to the maximum ot 
which it is capable. 
The first three paragraphs parallel the introduotory seo-
tions of the corpus of the R! Vlrtutibus is Communi, article 1. 
~rhe argumentation begins with a nominal definition ot !,irtu8 and 
then prooeeds to an essential definition of the term. As in the 
central text, the definitions cited 8.S essential are from Book II 
ot the Ethics and trom Book VI of the Physics. 
In the tinal paragraph, however, Saint Thomas clearly indi-
oates that he is making a transition from the notion of virtue in 
general to that ot human virtue. Ue gives a definition of b.uman 
virtu., "Quae pertieiet humanam potentiam ad aetum bonum et opti-
mum." Thi8 definition is an application ot 418208itio Rertecti 
~ o2timum to a more particular realm and probably indicates a 
8Cf. above PP. 8-13. 
certain preferenoe on his part for the definition from the 
Phlsics. 
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In his reply to the first difficulty, Saint Thomas adds a 
note whioh will aid an understanding of virtue as disposing to 
entltatlve act: 
Potentia naturalis qua quis potest esse, est determinata ad 
unum, scilicet ad esse, ideo ipeius perfeetio secundum 
insam naturam potentiae esse potest, et ideo ipsa potentia 
virtus dicitur.9 
The natural potency which disposes something to existence 1s a 
determination to one thing, viz.,!!!!. Sinoe this disposition 
or perfection of ita very nature belong. to the potency. the 
poteney can be called. a virtue. Thus potency to being 1s similar 
to the natural powers in being a virtue. 
In the reply to the third difficulty, a distinction between 
~irtue and !.!!. is given: "Vis aocipitur pro omni eo quod est 
prinoipium operationis at non solum operationi. perfeotae, quod 
import at nomen virtutis."lO Thus!!! is a wider term than virtua, 
inolusive of the latter. Vis signifies any prinCiple ot opera-
-
tion, while virtu. is oonfined to prinoiples ot perfect opera-
tion., 
The next parallel text i. the third subordinate quer7 of 
the same article. It is conoerned with the problem, ·Videtur 
quod virtute. non sint habitus •• d actus." The solutio reads: 
. --
91~ III ~., 23. 1, J, sol. 1 ad 1. 
lDtbi4., 1 a.d J. 
-
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V1rtua proprie loquendo includlt reepectum adaliquid cujus 
principium sit, siout ourrendi vel essendi. Et quia aotus, 
inquantum hujusmodi, cum sit ulttmum, non ordinatur ad ali-
quid siout principium sed magis siout a1iouju8 ettectus, 
1deo actus virtue dicl non Eotest ,ia1 eo modo l~uendi ~ 
ba~itw! .2!.£ !ciu! iiOitniiiiur~ alcu oauiie--p;r e eeius.-n-
The principal sens. ot this passage is tbat virtues are not'acts. 
Virtue tnoludes a relationship to tbat tor whioh it is a principle 
Aot, however, sinoe it is tinal, can be ordered to anottler as an 
etfect but never as a prinoiple. Theretore, virtue. are not act. 
except in the 8enae tnat principles are sometimes described in 
terma ot tbeir results. 
In suaar,.. then, what doea tbe Cotqmentau S!! tbe Sentenoe. 
reveal about the mind ot Saint thomas on virtue' Firat, tbe 
det1nitlon, d1s208itio e!rrecti !! opt1!Q!. ie exp1icit1,. stated 
in Book III. Distinction 23 and implicitl1 contained in the di8-
eU88ion ot Book II, Distinction 27. It seemarea80nable to assume 
at this point tbat it is the essential detinition ot the term. 
Second1,., in Di.tlnctlon 23 a clear distinction 1a drawn between 
virtue 1n general and buman Virtue, and dls20s1tio p!rteoti ~ 
o~t1mum was given .s tbe det1n1tion ot virtue in general. 
Thirdl." only the natural potenoie. and habit. are used as e:um-
plea ot virtue J a taot which. ~·l'a1s.s a question how important in 
Aquinas-s mind the 8econd category ot tbe cl.ssitic.tion tntbe 
central text i.. Pinall" ~iolentia was given aa a .ynoD1M tor 
virtus. 
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The next parallel is the fifth lecture of Book II of the 
Con:..men~,i!.r.z 2!1 !h.2. Ethics. Am.ong the parallel texts, it consti. 
tutes a middle point in Aquinasts asvalopment.l2 It is not very 
nelpful to the present study ot virtuA in general. 
Saint Thomas gives the framework ot his discussion in the 
fifth lecture with the followlng words: 
Ad p~~rscrutandum quid est virtus, oportet assumere, quod 
tria aunt in anima, scilioet passiones, potentiae at habi-
tus. Quorum alterum neeses. est esse t"irtutem. Dixit anim 
ffiristoteleg supra quod virtus est principium quarumda.m 
opera.tionum animae. lUhil autem est in anima, quod sit 
operationis prineipium, niai al1.c:uod hol"1ll11 trium.13 
Aristotle considers three aspects of the soul: the pa.ssions, the 
powers, and the habits. One category must be identical -vnth the 
virtues; tor virtues are pX'inciples of opera.tion, and these three 
constitute the only p~inciples of operation in the soul. 
The virtues are not passions: 
Secundum virtutea dicimur boni, at secundum malitias oppoai. 
tas dicimur mali. Sed secundum passiones absolute conaide-
ratas non dicimur boni vel mali. Ergo passiones neque sunt 
12Aecording to Grabmann the CO~4ntarJ on the Ethics was 
written between the years 1261 and 1 .• 6 .~tIn G~abmann, 
Thomas Ag,uinaa, trans. Vi~gll r,!1chel. O.S.B. (New Yo~k: Long-
mans, Green, & Co., 1928). P. 19. Variant opinions ares tbat 
the commentari on the Ethics WftS w.ri tten about 1260--Cf. Gerard 
Verbelie, "ta are ~oommentair. sur llethique,U Revue Phi1oso'li4 
phiQue de Louvain {19t~ 9 ),XL VI I. p. 220; tha. t it was wr! t ten . 
arter tlii lSrIiii Pars--ot. A. Mansion, "La date du Oomm.entairede 
S. Thomas sur l'1iEIque," Revue Philosophi~ue de Louvain (19$2), 
L, P. ~71J that it was written ~urlng the 1ea.rs-X21b-l~11-.Cf. 
A. Gauthier. O.P •• "La date du conunentaire sur ItEthique," 
Recherches ~ ~heoloii& Anoienne !! Medievale (19$1), XVIII, PP. 
1101+-5. 
13In II Eth., 5. n. 290. 
- -
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virtutes neque malitiae.14 
Nor are they potencies: 
Nullu. bonus vel malus dicitur, neque laudatur neque vltu. 
peratur ex hoo, quod potest pati. seoundum aliquam passionem, 
pu'a ex hoc quod potest lra801 vel timers. Sed secundum 
virtutes et malitlas dicimur bonl vel mall, et laudamur vel 
vl'up.~.~. Ergo virtut •• et malitia. non sunt poten. 
'l&e. l ;.1 
Tb.ay are habi ta J 
Ooncludit propoaitum: quia soilicet si virtute. non aunt 
passiones neque potentia., relinquitur quod sunt habitus 
.eoundum dlvisionem pra.mias ... 16 
Tile general arsument i. thi.: aooording to "ir'bue and vice, men 
are praised or blamed, inasmuch. as men bave passiona and express 
them, tbel are not praised or blamed, b7 a process ot elimination, 
hab1ts are tbe on17 principles ot operation with.in tbe BOul which. 
can be virtues. Since this art1cle is confined to buman virtue, 
it i. not ot speoial significance for the present •• udJ'. 
The final parallel text to be discussed bere 1s the til'S' 
article of tbe fifty-fifth question in the SU!!!, ~rtma-S.oun. 
dae.11 Directly tbe question concerns human virtue. Since, hov-
ever, it approaches its subject througb the more general notion of 
virtua, it is significant for the present stud;r. It should be 
noted tbat tbe writing ot the present ~ext 1. clos •• t in time to 
~!2j!., n. 299. 
lSIbid., n. 303. 
i6Ibid.. n. lOS. 
11!_!_, I-II, SS, 1 o. 
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the oomposition of ~ Vi£~utlbua !e Co.mmunl.18 A more mature 
viewpoint i. evidenced by tbe olear argumentation ot the. article. 
The 62rRus ot the Summa ~heolosiae, 1 .. 11, SS, 1 reads t 
Virtua ncm1nat quandam pot.ntiaa perfeotione.. Uniuscujua-
que autem pertectio praeoipue oonsideratur in ordine ad ' 
suum. rine.. Pini. aute. potentiae aotus est. Uncle poten-
tia dicitur e •• e pertecta, .eoundum quod determ1natur ad 
suum .. tum. 
Sunt aute. quaedam potentiae quae secundum .eipsa. 
aunt determ1Datae ad .uos aotua, siout potentiae natural •• 
act! vae. Et ideo h.ujuamodl potentia8 naturale a .ecundum 
a.ipsa. dlcuntus- virtut ••• -.Potentlae auhm rationale •• 
quae lunt propriae nomini., non aunt determinatae ad unum, 
•• d .e habent iad.terminata. ad multa: deteN1nantUl' aut.1t 
ad actus per habitu., siout ex aupradictia patet. Et ideo 
Yr1;tiWie• tmItM. blb1tua !!Ii.19 
A. in the tiPs, artiole ot the 1!!. ViPtutibu .!!l O~. Saint 
Thoma. begins with a nominal detinition ot virtue. "Virtu nomi-
nat ••• potentia. pertectionem." Virtu. i8 the perfection ot a 
potenc,... 
Prom 'his notion, he aJ'gue. to an e8.ential detini tion ot 
the tel'll. Bve17 p8pteotion 1s unc1er.tooc1 according to it. fina-
1it7_ The tinalit7 ot pot.n07 i. act. Th.us, to sa7 tbat a pot-
enol" 1. perteet i8 to as.eM tbat it i. determined to act. The 
not10n ot viJ'tue aa a deteNinatlon ot a potane,. 11;0 ita aot 18 
18Mandonnett s opinion was that the Prima-Secunc.iae waa wr1 t-
ten between the ,.ear. 1269 and 1270 J GrablUl'm milnt.med 1 twa. 
oampleted by Maroh, 1266. Cf. Vernon J. Bourke, Tnomlatio Bib11o-
graJ&11920-1249 (St. Louis: The Modern SonooJ.ma.n, rqq:$J, p. 13. (lloneuTs opIiiIon ia identical with tnat of Mandonnet. ct. p. 
G1orieux, "POUl' 1& chronologie de la SOlIIIe," MellYea ~ 801enoe 
Ra11s1euae, (194.$), II, P. 94. ,,' \ c:, -:-'''' .. 
'¥~, \ __ .F :-,A~.> :_. 
191_1_, I-II, SS, 1 o. f ..... /" 
;.Ci v~ L"', \.). 
c ",! J '\,' ;::._':.:; 'T--, 
J 
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equivalent to the all'ead7 studiett20 essential detinition ot virtus 
as <!~s20sitio perfect! .!i! optimum. 
In the, second pa.ragra.ph. a cl:i~sil'ication of virtues, 
alternativo to that ot the ~ Virtutibus .!!! Oommuni. 1, is given. 
1'wo types are mentioned. The first type is the powers determined. 
to act 01' their vePf nature. Theae are tbe "potentia. tantum 
aotivae" ot tbe central text. Example. ot tbe.e powers according 
to ,be S\Ur1I1a are the natural powers. The rational powers fall 
in'a tbe s.oond cateso:roy. S1 nature, th..,. are not determined to 
an,. specitio act. To be determined to a special operation, tD.e,. 
require determination br babits. The seoond O&togo17 of virtue 
hepe comes th.1rd in the olasaifioation of the central text. 
Tb.e difterenoe in olassitication results trom & ditterenoe 
in principle. In the R!. Vlrtutibus !n 09!Pun1 the prinoiple 01' 
olassification il tb. aotivity or pasaivity ot the powers. Suoh 
a principle yields three oategories ot virtue. The olassitioa-
tOl'J' ppinciple ot ttle Prima-Seoundae, SSt 1 i. tbe determination 
ot tbe powers to ODe or more tban one aot bY' nature. It is hard.lJ' 
aurprising tbat such a prinoiple 71e1ds only two categories. The 
c1as.ifioation ot th. J)e Vll'tutibus in OOlllllUDi oompreband. all 
....... ., ---
categories ot tbe classitioation in the Summa plus an additional 
• 
In his rep11 to the tirst difficultY'. Saint thomas state.: 
Quandoque virtu. dioitur id ad quod 8at virtua, soilioet 
vel obJeotum virtuti., vel aetua ejus, sieut tIdes dieitur 
quandoque id quod ereditur, quandoque vero ipaum er.der., 
quandoqu. aut.m ips. habitus quo ereditur. Unde quando 
dicitur quod virtue eat ultimum pot.ntiae, aumitur virtu. 
pro objeeto virtut!s. 1d en1m in quod ultimo potentia 
pot.st, est id ad quod dieitur v1~tU8 rei: .ieut si ali-
quis pote.t terre centum libra. at non plus, virtue ejus 
conaideratur secundum oentum l1br&D, non autem secundum 
saxaginta. Objectio aute. proeedebat ac 8i e •• entialiter 
virtus e ••• t ultimum potentiae.21 
In answering the diffioulty, Saint Thomas points out that vir~~ 
is sometime. used tor the object or tbe act 01' virtue. Por exam-
ple, taith .ometimes reters to what i8 believed, at other time. 
to the act 01' belier, and sometime. to the babit by which "e 
believe. Only the t1nal usage properly conveys the notion of 
tai th a8 a virtue. Tn. ditticult)" propo.ed is adjudged inValid 
aince it pooeed8 as it ttle teN 'rirtu. were being used properl,. 
onl1 when it is applied to the object 01' a virtuous act. 
Thia passage i8 important tor the tollowina reaaon. Saint 
Tbomas bere reoognize. two Wlage. 01' virtu. (as reterring to the 
operative act and to ita objeot) which do not retlect tbe •••• n-
tial meaning 01' tbe term. Thu. it will not b •• urpri.ing to tind 
usages in his writings not contoNable with the definition, di.-
-
2o.1tio i!rtecti ~ opt~. 
R.lat1 v. to thi. pa •• age, two 1 tems should be noted about 
the article which immediately follows it d •• pite the fact that 
the subsequent article is not a parall.l text. The first item i. 
.36 
in tbe third difficulty wMcn bagina I "PnetGPea, Pb.ilo8opbus 
dicit ••• quod virtue eat dlspo.ltio pertecti ad opttmum."22 
In the iU.tfloultl. Aqulnaa mentions the essential c:lennltion onlJ' 
indlrectlr and attribute. it to Aristotle. In bia reply to the 
difficulty. nowaver. b.e do.. not qu.etten tn. valld1 t1 of the 
de rint tlon but on11 tbe acouracl of 1 ta in.terpHtatlon bl tbe 
supposed 01>joctor.23 
The ripst paragraph. of the 02£2ul 1a also wol"th.7 of atten-· 
tlon: 
tb 1 , • 
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Virtus, ex ipsa ratione nominis, import at quandam pertec-
tione. pot.ntiae • • • • Unde, cum duplex 81 t potentia, 
8cillcet potentia ad .sse et potentia ad agere, utriuaqua 
potentiae p.rtectio virtu. vooatur. S.d potentia ad e8 •• 
• e t.net ex parte matenae, quae eat ens in potentia, poten-
tia auta a4 agere .e tenet ex. parte tormae, quae e.t prin-
cipi~ agendi, eo quod unumquodque agit inquantum eat 
actu.ZI$. 
The bod,. ot tM. article, like the abea41 examined passages, 
beg1na with a nominal detinition ot y1rtua, -tbe pertection ot a 
potenol.- !ben lt is asserted tbat tbere are two t1P88 ot poten-
c1, poteno,. to being and PO"n07 to operation. fbe pertection ot 
eaoh ls a virtue. '.fMa olassitioatlon ot tne potenole. anA their 
viptuea is ditterent trOll tbe two olassitications al.ftaq en-
BetON tbe exam1Dation ot torthep text., it will be p!'otlt-
able to ... _anze wba.t tbe parall.el tIt_ tbe Ps:W-SeOUD9! baa 
oontribut.d to tb1a8tl1q. . POUI' oonoluiou aPe plal1td.ble. Tbe 
definltion hoa the o.ntpal. Mxt, di8lositit? artloti .!!! oRt1muta, 
alth.ougb. atated only obliql1e17, appears to be an .asential defini-
tlon .iaoe tbe diacuesion ot tbe •••• ntial meaning ot virtue in 
the oODus ot Q,uestion SS, Article 1 18 equivalent to it. i'vo 
alternate olae.itioationa ~t virtue, one according to the numb •• 
ot act. t01l8.l'48 wbich tbe subject potenol' is b,. natUl"e order.4, 
tbe s.cond acoorting to tbe act, tu.t or .econcl, towards vb.1ob 
the potenoy i. opdeped, aN tound, both ot wbicb. are 1 •• 21 oamp"-
bensS. ve than the three oategorie. ot tbe central. text. The .80-
~.!., I-II, SSt 2 o. 
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ond olassifioation, however, introduces a type ot virtue, the dis-
position ot potenc1 tor being, which raises the questionwhsther 
the term vlrtus can be restricted to operative potencies. 
Finally, it should be noted that two 8.dd1tlonal non-essential 
meaninp~ are enoountered--virtue as aot and as object; yet it 
should be remembered that both. are ippl'"Dper uses ot the tel'm. 
All the directly parallel text. of ~ Virtutibus !n O~ 
have now been examined. There remain, however, two add! tional 
texts that are important to this stud7. The first is the De 
-
Veritate, Que8tion.~, Article 3.2$ The question posed at the 
beginning of this article is "Utrum tides sit virtus." Saint 
Tbomas answers thus: 
Virtus ex impositione sui nominis signiticat complemen1nlll 
act1vae potentiae. Activa autem potentia duplex est: quae-
dam quidem cujus aotio terminatur ad al1quid aotum extra, 
sieut in aeditioatione aotio ter.minatur ad aeditioatum, 
quaedam vero est oujus actio non ter.minatur ad extra sed 
consistit in ipso agente ut visio in vidente • • • • 
In his aUtem duabu8 potent!1. d1versimode sumitur 
complementum. Q.u1dam en1m actus pIlimarum potentlarum • • • non 
sunt in tac1ente, sed in tacto: ideo complementum poten. 
t!ae acoipitur 1b1 penes Id quod tit. Unde at virtue dete~­
entis pondera dicitur esse in hoc quod maximum pondus detert 
• • • ; et similite~ virtue aediticatoris in hoc quod taoit 
domwn optimam. 
Sed quia alterius potentiae actus conslstit in agente, 
non in ali quo actu, ideo oomplementum illius potentiae 
aocipitur seoundum modum agendi, ut scilicet debite et oon-
venienter operetur, ex quo habet ejus actus ut bonus dies.. 
p p 
25The Di8~ted Questions on Truth were written between th.e 
year's 1256 and -59. <It. Vernon J. aourke, 1n Saint Thomas Aqui-
nas, Truth., trans. Robert W. Mulligan, 8.J., James V. MCGl1nn, 
a.J. t Ro~ert W. Sohmidt, 8.J. (Ohicago: Henrl RegnePJ Co., 19521, Introduotion, I, P. xvii. 
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tur. Et lnde est quod ln huJumodl patent1is yj.rtus dicl-
tur quae opus bonum reddlt.26 
Tb.e passage begins with It. nominal definition ot virtue, fttb.e tul-
tl1ment ot an active potency." Act!ve potancy can havo two mean-
ings. 1"I1"8t, tbeN 18 tbe t1" or active potency vh1ch terminates 
in something extrinsio to tbe agent, a.g., that of buIlding, which. 
terminates In the tninS buIlt. Seoondly, there Is the type whose 
actlon 1s imm.a.nent, e.g., that or .eeing, wtlose action 1s total11 
contained 1n the s.er. 
Aa the active potencle. differ, 80 the f'ultllment dl.fte:p ... 
In tbe oaa8 of a transient aotion, the tu1f'llment must be mee.8UJted 
according to tM effect ppoducect. 'I'bua the non twBouaebul14. 
ing 1. a good bouse. In tbe C&88 or immanent action, the fulfil-
ment must be measured in terms of the operation witb.ln the agent. 
'rbus the no"" ot .eeing 18 good sight. 
The signIficance ot this text 18 twotold. Firat, it offe.,.. 
a thlrdolaaalt1catlon of virtu. aooaNing to POW". Viptu •• 
are distinguished acoordlng to their potencie8--tor transient or 
im.manent aota. Seoondl7, tMs classifioation or virtues accol"'4-
ing to tran.lent powers poaes a 8191'11011. 41tfl.oult7_ On tbe basi. 
' .... 
ot this claeaitioation, 1t migbt b9 argued that the Oati!!! of 
the essential detinl tion, oan Ntel' to .omething eztl'in8io :rathep 
tban intrinsio. If thi. 1. 80, it co~110ta vito numerous Thea-
F 1 n .. 
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1stio texts already oited. However .. it does not seem that Saint 
Tbomas meant the optimum to refer to something extrinsio since he 
points out in his reply to the third difficulty. 
Bonum illud ad quod virtus ordinatur .. non est aooipiendum 
quasi aliquod objectum alloujus aotus) sed 111uo. bonum est 
ipse aotus pertectus, quem virtus e1101t.27 < 
Is there, tnen, a oontl'a.diotion of the coreus in the reply to tbe 
tbird diffioulty? A oloser examination of ttle body of tbe arti-
ole reveals tbat Saint Tbcmas speaks only of the "virtus deferen-
tis pondera" and "virtu. aedifloatoris," i.e., of the subjeot 
which operates. In the reply to th.ediffioulty, be affirms that 
virtue belongs to the operator and not to the effeot. 
The tlnal text to be examined is in the Summa Theo10siaeJ 
it is tbe oorpus of Artio1e 1 01' Question 71 01' the Prima-Seog-
dae. The artiole at issue deal. with the question "Utrum Vitiu.m 
-
Contrarietv Virtuti?" Saint 1'11011.as answers a. tollows: 
Clra virtutem duo possumus considerue: scilicet ipsam 
essentiam. virtutl.J et id ad quod est virtus. In easentia 
quidem virtutls aliquid oonsiderari potest directe, et all-
quid ex conaequenti. Directe quldem virtus importat dis-
positionem quandamalicujus convenlenter ae babentis secun-
dum modum suae naturae, unde Ph110sophus dicit ••• quod 
v!rtua est 41spos1tio pertect1 ad optimum, dloo aute. per-
teot!, quod est dispositum seoundum nature. FiX. consequent1 
autem sequitur quod virtus sit bonitas quaedam: ln hoo 
enim oons1st1t uniusoujusque rei bonitas. quod oonvenlenter 
se habeat seoundum modum suae natune. Id autem ad quod 
virtus ordinatur. est aotus bonus.2ti 
27Ibld., 3 ad 3. 
28S.T., I-II, 71, 1 oJ the reterence to Aristotle within 
the quotatIon 1s the tollowing' !9l!., VII, 3, 246'0, 23. 
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Acoording to Aquinas, virtue can be considered according to its 
essence or its object. He turther divides the consideration 
according to essence into what virtue directly signifies and what 
result it achiaves. 
Virtue oan be direotly defined as a disposition of a subjeot 
whioh is wall-disposed acoording to its nature. In terms ot its 
oonsequence, virtue can be detined as the diepositio Eertecti ~ 
optl~ where the Eertectum is that which has been disposed ac-
oordin.g to its nature. The result ot virtue 1s the goodness it 
oonveys as a tormal perteotion. The object ot virtue is a good 
act. 
The signlfioant element in this passage is a direct state-
ment by Saint Thomas in his prinoipal work that virtue is dis2~­
~itio 2erfecti !S oEtimum. The further explanation of 2erfect~ 
is consistent with the discussion ot the term a~ead1 rendered.29 
It should be noted in passing that Saint Thomas here also treats 
virtue in the context ot moral virtue. 
In the light ot the texts examined in this chapter it is 
now possible to see what answers have been provided to the ques-
tiona lett bY' Chapter II tor further development and whether any 
new questions have been raised. An initial set or questions con-
cerned the definition ot virtus, di8208itio 2ertecti ~ opti~. 
Two questions were asked. First, is the above definition actual17 
290f. above, pp. 11-12. 
central? Since it aopears in a treatment concerning the theologi-
cal, intellectual" and moral virtues, is it perhaps a definition 
of virtue as a habit rather than virtue in general? The present 
chapter has conri~ed that the definition encompasses all genuine 
uses of virtual 
... 
Three times30 the definition was explicitly 
stated, twice31 as a general detinition of virtue. In the 
Commentarz ~ lh! Sentences, a claar distinction was drawn between 
two definitions ot virtue, one general and the other particular, 
and dis~osltio pertac~! ~ oetimum was given as the definition of 
virtue in general.32 Elsewhere virtue was defined as a "determi_ 
nation of potency to aot"33 and "wb.e.t determines an operative 
potenoy to specitic types of aet,"34 both ot which detinitions 
are equivalent to ~i8positio perrect~ ~ optimum. 
The second question about the central definition was this: 
will a further study at Saint Thomasts writings reveal that he 
uses the term virtu. in connection with potencies which are not 
operative? Again the answer must be in the atfirmative. Aquinas 
disoussed in two textslS the virtue ot potency for being. In 
30In III Sent., 23, 1, 3, 801. 1: S.T •• I-II, 2 ad 3. _Ibld., 
10.- - -- ~ 
31In III ~., 2), 1, 3, sol. 1, ~_!., I-II, 71, 1 c. 
32!e III !!ai., 23, 1, 3, 801. 1. 
ll!_!., I-II, SS, 1 o. 
~In II !!ei., 27, 1, 1 sol.1 ~., 1 ad 3. 
lSIn III Sent., 23, 1, 3, sol. 1 ad 1: 1.1., SS, 2 c. 
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one36 he explained why it was legit1mate to talk about such a 
virtue. Virtue is that which determines a potency to a single 
thing, e~d potency to being is determined to one thing, the act 
or existence. This type of virtue is virtue only by analog1, 
since the disposition of potency for existence is not the same as 
the dis2ositio of the definition.37 
A second set ot questions inquired whether the central defi-
nition38 and its important terms could be clarified. Each impor-
tant term has been clarified. Dis2ositio, as a first act, is a 
formal perfection, as a second act, it is with the subject pa-
tenoy a principle of operative activity.39 Both notions are nec-
essary. Virtue is a formal determination, not exclusively in the 
sense ot formal cause, but especially in the sense that form is 
the principle of efficient activity. The meaning ot eerfe~~~ is 
)6In III Sent •• 23. 1, ), 801. 1 ad 1. 
- -
37cf. De Vir. in Com ,lad 9, where a distinction 1s drawn 
between the drspositTOn~matter tor act and the disposition 
whioh is identical with virtue. 
Jarhe central definition d1sposit10 perfeoti ad optimum was 
paraphrased in a Marietti edition as -QIspositio complens poten-
tiam ad eliciendum actum bonum. M Tbe complens potentiam ad elici-
endum actum emphasizes that virtue i8 what completes the potency 
enabling it to act as it does. The obvious example is the human 
intellect. This power by nature is open to all being. To explain 
specific acts of knowing--wny the poet looks at the sun and thinks 
verse, the chemist looks at the same objeot and thinks formulas--
requires the notion of virtue as habit. ct. Saint Thomas Aquinas, 
StmI'IU. TheolOfiae, I-II, ed. De Rubeis, et ale (Turin: Marietti, 
lCJJiBJ, p. ~ • 
39!! II Sen~ •• 27, 1, 1 ad 3. 
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found to be developed in terms ot the phrase "secundum naturam."40 
When the subject power has been perteoted b,. virtue, it has been 
tormally determined in a manner suitable to its nature. In tbe 
case ot totall,. active potencies, the virtue is the nature itselt; 
in the case ot habituated potencies, tbe power is enabled to act 
more tully in acoord with its nature. Pinal11, it has been twice 
affirmed that optimum is the operative act and not an object.41 
A third .et ot questions was thus statedt are there usage. 
ot virtus not mentioned in the central text? Are the usages ot 
the oentral text the most important or are there other important 
usages to be diSCOYfU"ed? De Virtutibua !!! .... Oommwl .. · .... ·;;;;,;o;;.i lists three 
oategories: the virtue ot totally active potencies, tbat ot 
purely passive potenoies, and that ot habituated potenoies. 
Three usages not reducible to these haye been uncovered. Besides 
the virtue ot potenoy to being, alrea4T treated, virtue as opera-
tive aot and virtue as objeot were enoountered. But both were 
given by Saint Thomas as uses b1 others; not oonsistent with his 
own teohnical use ot tbe term.42 There do, ot course, remain 
other use. ot the term virtue in the writings ot Aquinas which 
have not ~et appeared. The ensuing chapter will be devoted to 
their studT. 
40Ibi4., 1 sol.1 Ibid., 1 ad 3. 
- -4l~q III !!!l., 23, 1, 3, sol. 1, ]! !!t., ~, 3 ad 3. 
42S•T., I-II, SS, 1 ad 1. 
--
From the examples of virtue used in the texts so far seea, 
it becomes obvious that two types ot virtue are primary in the 
mind of Aquinas--the natural potencies and the habits. Among 
Thomistic examples ot virtue, purely passive potencies are con-
spicuous by their absence. 
To the classitication or virtues given in the central text, 
thr •• alternatives are ottered in the texts seen in this chapter 
--virtues ordained to being and those ordained to operation,~3 
virtues ordained to one act and those ordained to many acts,~ 
and virtues ordained to transient operation and those ordained to 
immanent operation.45 The scheme ot De Virtutibus in Oommuni ..... _.
still seems more adequate. It is more consistent with the essen-
tial derinition ot virtus than the tirst alternate since it does , 
not include virtus or potenoy to being, an analogous usage ot the 
term. furthermore it is equally comprehensive as and more exten-
sive than the la8t two. 
The tinal questions conoern the context ot the central tex.t. 
Is there a certain primaoy in the mind ot Saint Thomas to be 
attributed to the virtues which are habits' All eigh~6 or the 
43In III !!2!., 2), 1, ), 101. lJ 1_1., I-II, SS, 2 c. 
~.!., I-II, SS, 1 c. 
4SD! .Y.!.£., 14, ). 
46ne Ve~., ~, 31 In II Eth., 51 In II Sent., 27, 1, 1; In 
III Sent:; ~ 1, 3, lol:-J., lli!(I., 101;-)1 !.!., I-II, SS, 1,-
~~J ~., 11, 1. -
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texts cited in the course of this chapter are in the context of 
virtue as a habit. At first flush. then, the answer would seem 
to be ~.s. And ret could the evidence be ciroumstantial? In no 
place does Saint Thomas explicitl, recognize any primacy, logical 
or metaphysical, tor virtue as habit. Suttice it to say here that 
the conclusion of this study will be that no such primacy should 
be acoorded the virtues which are habits, that there exists a 
more plausible explanation of the context of these passages. The 
conoluding ehapter ot the thesis will treat tbe matter more tho-
roughly, since the question about primacy ot usage oan be best 
answered atter all the usages ot v1rtus in the writings of Saint 
Thomas have been studied. 
What, then, are the questions which will guide the discus-
sIons In the subsequent chapters? First, there is the question 
about the context ot all the passages concerning virtue in gen-
eral. Is virtue taken as a habit to be accorded some kind ot 
primacy? This question will be answered in the concluding chapter 
Secondly, are there uses ot virtue still to be encountered? The 
following chapter will be devoted to answering this question. 
Finalll. there is tbe minor question whether there are any other 
inatances in the writings ot Saint Thomas ot the second oategoF,T 
ot the central text, tbe virtues ot purel7 passive potencies. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE DERIVED USAGES OF VIRTUS IN THE WRITINGS OF SAINT THOMAS 
The fOUJ.'l'th chapter of this thesis will be devoted to a 
study of the usages 01' the term virt'!! not already mentioned in 
the prior chapters. With the aid ot the lexicons of Schutz1 and 
Deferrari-Barr7,2 nine distinct meanings ot the subject term in 
• I r • 
lRvirtus_.a) Kraft. Vermogen, Fahlgkeit, d.i. nacbates 
PriDCip einer Thatigkeit, SplODym mit potentia, potestaB und vis. 
b} personificierte Kraft. d.1. Kraft 1m Sinne eines peraonlichen 
wesenaf. c) Kratt, Macht, Moglicb.kelt zu einem Sein, synonJ"Dl mit 
potent a, del' Gegenaatz r.u actus, und habitua, d) Tuchtigkeit, 
Tugend, alllonym mit bonitas und pertectio, e) Tugend dea m.enBchen 
1m Sinne eineahabitus, del' Gegensatz zu malitia und vl:bium, 
t) Kratt, Starke, Macht, aynoft1m mit tortitudo, potentia und vis, 
g} hoch.ete ICPattleistung, hochate Leistung, aynon,.. mit !'ortitudo 
und potential h) wunderbare Krattleiatunf' Wunder, 8ynony:m mit 
miraculum; 1) Sinn. Bedeutung. synonym at intellectua, ratio, 
sensua, signitloatio und vis. Ludwig Schutz Thomaa-Lexikon, 
2nd ed. (New York: MUaurgia Publishers, n.d.J, pp. 852-6$ pasaim. 
2"(1) Power, taoult7, aptitude, or capaoity. the proximate 
principle of actiVity, aynoD1BS ot potentl~, potestaa, vis, (2) 
Personified power, i.e. power in the aense ot a personal being, () Power, might, potentiality in a being, synonJM ot potentia and 
potestas, the oppoaite ot actus and habitus, (4) Ability, virtue, 
aynonym of bonitaa and pertectio, (S) TM virtue of man in the 
aense of a habitus, the opposite of malitia and vitium, (6) Power, 
strength, might, synolQ'm of fortitudo, potentia, and vl.S, (7) Tb.& 
bighest feat ot 8trengtbe tne highest accomplishment, synonym ot fortitudo and potentiar 8) A wondertulteat of strength, wonder, 
SynOD1JB ot miraculum, 9) Sense, meaning, S1ll0nymot intellectua, 
ratio, senaus, sign1tioatio, and vis." Roy J. Deterrari & Siater 
M. Inviolata Barry, O.D.P., A Lexicon 01' SaiDt Thomas A3uinas, (WaShington: Catholio univeraity 01 AmerIca 'reas, 194 J, ·P. 
1159. 
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the wri1-,ings ot Saint Thomas oan be listed: (1) proximate prin-
ciple ot activity, (2) personitied power; (3) power or potency 
(as opposed to act or habit), (4) goodness, (S) good habit as 
opposed to vice), (6) strength; (1) highest teat of strength; 
(8) tbe miraculous, (9) meaning. The f1rst, tourth, and titth 
bave a11'8ad,. been enoountered and discussed (the texts oi tec:l tor 
:mmlber (4). "goodness," being pusage. in which. Aquina8 explains 
that virtue oan be defined aa "pert.otio potentiae"). There 
remain. then 8ix meaninga atill to be treated. The order ot treat .. 
ment will be ttl. following: tirst, the personified POW&:;:'s 01" 
angels will be disoussed.in oonjunotion with a closely allied 
meaning, miraole. Seoondly. the use ot virtue as power will be 
examined; this meaning enoampasses three familiar u.ages .... the 
pre.enoe of element. in a oompound, the relation.b.ip of oonolu .. 
sions to their premises, and the influenoe ot a principal oause 
on i t8 instrument. Thirdl,., somem!scellaneous employments of the 
term--virtue signifying meaning and strength, the latter of whioh 
irlcludes the use 01' virtue in regard to cause and etfect--will be 
treated. Finally. virtul as limit or highest fea.t ot strength 
will be investigated. 
In the writings of Saint Thomas virtus frequently is a 
... 
synon,.. for angel. Although the term is most orten applied to a 
particular or-der, it can reter to all angels: 
Vir-tUB autam dupliciter accip! potest. Uno modo, communi-
tel', seoundum quod est media inter essentla:m et operationeun 
et sio omnes caelestes spiritus nominantur oaelestes virtu-
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tea, sicut et caelestes essentia.. --Alio modo, secundum 
quod import at quendam excessum tortitudinis: et sic est 
proprium nomen ordinis.) 
There is a general 8ense in which all angels are properly oalled 
virtues. TheY' are a middle ground between essence and operation, 
a conjecture by the author ot the thesis is that the probable 
meaning of this phrase i. that angela mediate between the divine 
plan and its application to particular ettecta. This notion ot 
virtue as a mean between essence and operation 1s similar to the 
use ot tbe term virtue tor a habit which mediates between the 
•••• nce ot a taculty and it. operation. 
Virtua, however, when used to signify an angel, more common-
ly reters to a specitic order within a hierarchy. The reaaon tor 
the usage given in the text cited above is that of pseudo-Dion1-
sius.4 In more ample discussions ot virtue applied to a particu-
lar order ot angels, Saint Thomas explains more tully whl he 
believes the order is appropriate11 named. 
Virtus can signlfJ either of two orders. fhe one specified 
depends on the scheme employed--whether .1t 1s that ot pseudo-Dio-
ny-sius or that ot Gregory the Great. For the tormer, the middle 
order ot the second hierarcb1 merited the title Virtute., tor the 
latter, the same title belonged to the tirst order ot tbe third 
3!.!., I, 108, $, ad 1. 
4"Unde Dion1sius dicit quod namen Virtutum signiticat quan-
dam virilem et inconcussam tortitudinem •••• ft Ibid. The ret-
ex-ence to pseudo-Dionysius witb.in tbe quotation is: !1.,g;.,), 
PP. 20$tt'. 
So 
hierarohy. Some background will be ne~essar1 on how the various 
order a ot angels were named,. According to pseu4o-D,.oDJsiua.5 
there were tbree hie~arohies ot angelic spirits. Since angels are 
spiritual beings. each hierarch,. had two specitio taska:, one 
intelleotual,. the othel' .,.0111;ion&1.6 The tirst h1eraNb.J oontem-
plated the universe 1n the ess.noe ot God and then oonaidePed tbe 
end ot oreation. Tb.e secol1d order cont.mplated 0.e&t10n in its 
universal causes and oared tor the seneral dispoaition ot its 
impleMntation. The third order understood oreation in terms ot 
the oreaturea thUlselves and curied out the details ot tbe 
d1 vine plan. 
POI' pseudo-DlonJsius,. the virtues belonged to the seoond. 
h1eraron,.1 For tbis group,. the general dispos1tion ot oreation 
$"Primo 191tur videamua rationam ass1gnationis Dion1811. 
In qua consideran4um est quod sieut supra diotum e.t, prima 
tder8.1'Ohia &Geipit rationes rel'UJl in ipso Deo, aecunda vero in 
cau.i. univeraalibUa, tertia vero a.oundua deteratnatlonem ad 
speciales ettectus. .t quia Deua e.t tlnis non solum angelicol'Wl 
m1rdsteriol'Ull aed etiam totius creaturu. ad prim .. bierarchiam 
pertiDet consideratio tl11is, ad _41_ vero disposl tio un1.e:&'-
aalia 4e agendis, ad ult!_ aut_ applicatl0 41spoaltlonis ad 
effeotua, quae •• , operia eaoutio, haeo en1m tria manit •• tum .st 
in quallbet operatione inY8n1ri~- Ibid., 6 o. 
'"Dioqralua exponi' ordlnua nomina aeoundum oGn.en1entl88 
ad .plritua1e. parteotlone. eorwa." Ibid., S o. The retePen .. to 
pseudo-DI0D7siu8 within tbe qUMation I.. la-i., 3, pp. 205tt. 
l-Ad aubernationi. aut .. ration.. tria pertinent. ~orua 
primum e.t d.tin! tl0 eol'Ull qua. asenda aunt. quod .st propriUll 
DaminatioDUm. Seoundum aute. ea' pl'ubere taoultatem ad implen-
dum. quod partinet ad Vil'tutea. Tertium aut_ e.t ordinare qua-
liter ea quae prae.epta vel d.etinita auot, impleri possint. ut 
ali qui exequantU1" et b.oo pertine' act Pote.tate •• " ibid.., 6 e. 
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entailed th1'ee duties: (1) to detel'mine what had to be done, 
(2) to present a £aculty ready to exeoute the task, (3) to desig-
nate how the divine dacrees were to be executed. The second duty. 
npraebere taeultatem ad implendum.n was the special property ot 
the Virtues. This use of virtus has ita baais in the essential 
meaning ot the t&~. Virtus is a tormal determination to opera-
tion, it indicates that the power is fully prepared to aot. The 
pU1"pose ot the heavenlY' Virtutes is similar. They had to provide 
a power ready ~o carry out the divine precepts. 
Aocording to Gregory the Great. who named the angels acoord-
ing to theil~ ministries.8 virtu. more properly described the 
tirst order of the third hier~h1.9 In the exeoution of the di-
vine plan. it was their ministry to perform the mir",eulous. In 
the ~ompendium Theolosiae. Saint Thomas amplities wbJ Gregory can 
legitimately use virtus to desoribe this order: 
Sueremus autem bujus bierarchiae ordo secundum Gregorium • 
• • vtr'iutes dieuntur ex eo quod as. quae sunt supra naturam 
operiiTEur. in argumentum eorum quae nobis supra rationem 
nuntiantur: unde ad virtutes pertinere diei tUX' miraoula 
t8.08re.10 
In tne Gregorian scheme the Virtues are the angels wno operate 
SnGregorius vero, in exposition. horum nominum, magis atten-
dere videtup exteriora miniateria." Ibid., S c. The reference to 
GregoPJ within the quotation is: !.~:;-76, 1250, 12510-d. 
9nPost quas sunt Virtutes, quae habent potestatem super oor-
poralem naturam in operatione miraculorum.- Ibid., 6 c. The 
re.ferenGe to Gregory is the same as in tn. prevIous citation. 
10iomr. Theol., I, 126. The reterenee to Gregory is the 
same as nba previous oitations. 
over and above nature. They pertorm miracles. This usage is 
based on a similarity to virtue as habit. A power which is by 
nature open to all being is by habit determined to specific modes 
ot operation. Thus habit is something over and above the nature 
ot the power. Since miracles require a power which is capable of 
what is over and above the natural, the working of miracles is 
attributed to the Virtues. 
In this context it will be suitable to discuss an allied 
usage of virtus, the eighth sense listed above, as sJnonomous 
with miracle. Saint Thomas tella us that a miracle is "aliquid 
excedens taoultatem naturae. Et secundum hoc, miraoula dicuntur 
virtutes."ll Miracles exceed the capability ot nature. Thus 
they are called virtuea. Three explanations can be proterred tor 
this uae ot virtus. First, the phrase "excedens facultatem natu-
rae" indicates a similarity to virtue as habit, habit is something 
over and above the nature of a power, so is a miraole. Seoondly, 
this may be a case where the name ot the operant, the angelic 
Virtue, has been attributed to the operation, the miraole. 
Finally, virtus 'was used in the thirteenth oentury as a synonym 
for miraculum.12 Sinoe the usage is infrequent in thG works ot 
Saint Thomas, it would be difficult to discern wh1ch of the above 
reaaona was Saint Thomas's for using the term. 
ll!_!_, II-II, 178, 1, ad J. 
12J.H_ Baxter & Oharles Johnson, Medieval Latin Word-List, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1934), P. 4>8. - -
Besides virtue signifying angel and miracle, a common usage 
of the term in Thomistic writings is virtue as power or potency, 
the third sense distinguished above. This usage takes three 
torms. The first concerns tne presence 01' elements in a compound. 
~hese are said to be present virtUally (virtute). In one text1) 
Saint Tnomas considers three opinions bow elements exist in a com-
pound. First. he considers the opinion of Avicenna.~ The Arab 
pbilosopner maintained that the substantial torms 01' the elements 
are actually present in the compound; eacb substantial torm is 
subordinate to the foP.m ot the compound while actuating a separate 
portion 01' the prime matter. Saint Thomas rejects this opinion. 
He insists that, it the substantial .torms are actually present, 
and each actuates its own portion of the matter, no compound ex-
is.ts, but only a conglomeration of separate elements. The next 
opinion is that of' Averroes.1,$ According to tbe Oommentator. the 
131_!., I, 76, 4, ad 4. 
14"Avicenna posuit tormas 8ubstantiales elementorum integras 
remanere in mixto: mixtionem autem tieri secundum quod contrariae 
qualitates elemento~Im reducuntur ad medium.--Sed noc est impos-
sibile. Q.uia diversae tormae elementorum non possunt esse nisi in 
diversis partibus materiae, ad quarum diversitatem oportet intel-
ligi dimensiones, sine quibus materia divisibilis e8se non potest. 
Materia autem dimension! subjecta non invenitur nisi in corpore. 
Diversa autem corpora non possunt esse in eadem loco. Unde sequi-
tur quod elementa sint in mixto distincta secundum situm. Et ita 
non erit vera mixtio, quae est secundum totum: sed mixtio ad sen-
sUM, quae est seoundum minima juxta 8e pOBi ta. " !2.!.!!. 
lSuAverroes flutem posuit, in III de Caelo, quod tormae ole-
wentorum, propter sui impertectionem, Bunt mea!ae inter tormas 
accidentales et substantialesJ et ideo recipiunt magis et minus, 
et ideo remi ttuntur in mixtione et ad medium reducuntur, et con-
5!~ 
torms ot elements are present in a manner midway between substan-
tial and accidental form; tne substantial forms of the elements 
az-e gradually diminished until they merge into the one substan-
tial form 01' the compound. Saint Thomas rejects this opinion on 
two counts. First. there is no mean between substance and acci-
dent. Secondly, substantial existence cannot be reduced; exis-
tence admits only 01' being and non-being. Finally Saint Thomas 
states the opinion of Aristotle: 
Et ideo dicendum est, secundum Philosopbum in I de Generat., 
quod tOP.mae elementorum manent in mixto non aotu;-sed vIr-
tute. Manent en1m qualitatespropriae elem.entorum licet 
remissae, in quibus est virtue form8.rum elementariu.m. Et 
bujusmodi qualltas mixtionis est propria dispositio ad to~­
mam substantlalem COrPoris mixti, puta tormam lapldis. vel 
animas oujuseumque.1b-
The torms ot elements are present virtually, not actually, in a 
compound. What does this mean? First, the properties ot the 
elements are truly present although in a. diminished manner. Th.e 
properties ot the compound are determined by the properties ot 
its composing elements. These properties can be explained onl,. 
in tems ot the virtus ot tb.e ele.ments in their free state, i.e •• 
they are the natural outpourings of the SUbstantial torm which is 
tlatur ex eis una torma ..... Sed hoe est etiam magis imposaibile. 
Nam esse substantiale oujuslibet rei in indiviaibili eonsistltJ 
at omnia additio et subtractio variat speciem, sieut in numeris, 
ut dieltur in VIII Metaphrs. Unde impa.sibile est quod £orma 
substantialis quaecumque recipiat magis et minus.--Neo minus est 
imposslbile aliquid eSS8 medium inter sUbstantiam at aooidens." 
Ibid. 
-
16Ib1d. The referenoe to Aristotle within the quotation 1s 
~ Gener~!l Oorrupt., I, 10, )27b, 29-31. 
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disposed to operate in speoifio ways. Although the substantial 
.forms cease to exist in the oompound, the dispositions remain. 
Aquinas elsewhere explains in more detail tlle nature ot this 
virtual presence: 
Conslderandum est igitur quod qualitates aotivae et passi-
vae elementorum contraria. sunt ad invicem et magis et 
minus reoipiunt. Ex oontrarils autem qualitatibus quae 
racipiunt magis at minus oonatltui poteat media qualitas 
quae sapiat utriusqt~ oxtremi naturam, siout pallidum inter 
album et n1grua, et tepldum inter oalldum et trigldum. Sic 
igitur, nmissis exoellentiis qualitatum elementarium, oon-
stltl1itur ex hi. quaedam ql1al1ta. media qua. est pPOpria 
qualitas corporis mixti, di1"terens tamen in diversis se(um-
dum diversam mixtionis proportionem, at haec quidem qualitas 
est propria dispositio ad tormam oorporis mixti, sicut qua-
litas simplex ad formam corporis siMpliois. Siout igitur 
extrema inveniuntur in- medio, quod partioipat naturaItl utri .. 
usque J sic qualitates simp11cium corporum lnveniuntur 1n 
propria qualitate corporis mixti. Qualitas autemsimpliels 
oorporis .st quidem aliud a tONa substantial! ipsiua J ag1 t 
tamen in virtute formae substantialis, alioquin calor cale-
.faceret tantumJ non aute. per ejus actionem forma substan-
tialis educeretur in aotum, cum nihil agat ultra suam spe-
ciem. 
Sic igltur virtutes tormarum sUbstantialium simplicium 
oorporum in oorporibt18 mutis salvantur. Sunt igitur formae 
elementol."'Um. in oorporibus mixt!. non quidem actu, sed vir-
tute, .t hoc est quod dicit Aristoteles in primo de GeneI'. 
'Non manent igitur elementa in mixtoaotu ut corpUS et 
album, nec cor~tur nec e.lte~ nec ambo: salvatur 
enim virtue eorum.'17 
Again the discussion is in terms of the properties ot the elements 
in e. free state and those ot the compound. The properties 01" the 
compound are not identical with those of the elements in a free 
state; yet they are determined by the propert1.es ot the elements. 
The properties of the elements are not ac tuall;y present in the 
17De Mtxt. Elem •• S; the reference to Aristotle 1s the same 
as in the prev{ous oitation. 
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compound since they u.ndergo alterations; yet th.ey a.rtect the pro-
perties of the compound. As a oonsequence, some middle ground 
must be sought tor explanation; this middle ground is the virtual 
presence of elements in a compound. 
The key phrase for understanding in what t~is virtual pres-
ence oonsists is "virtutes formarun substantialium simplieiwG oor-
porum in corporibus mixtis salvantur." The dispositions of' the 
substantial forms tor their proper operations are still present. 
The substantial form is not present_ but itsvirtus or determine. 
tion to proper act remains. 
An example of' virtual presence in the writings of Saint 
Thomas io the inolusion of the prinoiple ot sensation in manta 
rational soul.18 Sensation 1s truly present in man--men l~ally 
see, hea~, eto.--althougn in a modified form; i.e., sensation is 
ordered to intelleotion in hur~ aotivity. Thus the sensitive is 
said to be virtuall, present--all tne proper operations al'$ evi-
dent: seeing, hearing, eto., but in a modified form. Th.e dispo-
a1 tiona tor certain acts remain even thougn they emanate fItom a. 
rational soul. The sensitive principle is virtuall1 present, 
1.e., the presence ot ita power is evident trom the operations 
proper to it. 
This usage ot virtue is close to the eaoential detinition. 
Since the properties ot the compound are determined by the proper-
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ties of the elements, the elements are said to be virtual11 pres-
ent. Although the substantial forms of the elements no longer 
exist. their detel"'minationa to specific operations remain. This 
condition is described as the virtual presence of elements in the 
compound. 
Another usage ot virtue as power is the pres.nce of conclu-
sions in principles. About this phenomenon. Saint Thomas sa7s: 
Unde quando ali qua multa virtute continetur in al1quo uno 
dicuntur esse in lllo implicite, aicut conclusiones in prIn-
cipiis. EXplicite autem in aliquo continentur quod in eo 
actu existit: unde ill. qui oognoscit aliqua prinoipia 
universalia habet 1mp1icitam cognitionem de omnibus conc1u-
sionibua particularibus t qui aute. conolusionea actu con-
siderat, dicitur ea explicit. cognoscere.19 
A man who understands the universal prinoiples ot a science has 
implicit knowledge ot conolusions. Whan be draws the necessary 
cODClusions, be haa exp1ioitknovledse. But betore he draws the 
ooncluaiona, how are theT contained in the prinoiples? Saint 
Thomas answers tbat oonolusions are virtually present in the 
prinoiples trom whioh the1 are drawn. 
What is the nature of this virtual presence? An example 
trom contempor&r7 mathematics will illustrate what is meant. A 
mathematician, who thoroughl1 understands the detinitions of real, 
imaginary, and complex numbers, the totalit1 of finite numbers, 
can draw the oonolusion that all tinite Dumbers are oomplex.20 
19De Ver., 14, 11 o. 
--
20.A, oomplex number is a number wb.:l.cb. oan be written in the 
form a + bl. It a is equal to aero, tnen we have an imaginary 
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How was the conclusion present in the three detinitions? Cer-
ta1nly not in act since the detini tion of complex numbers does 
not state anything about these numbers' including the other two. 
Nor is the conclusion there in pure potency: given the three 
definitiona, the most logical conclusion is that the class com-
plex includes the other two. As a consequence, a sort of middle 
ground must be sought. This middle ground is virtual presence. 
The conclusion is present in the power or virtue ot thorough 
understanding ot the d.etini tions to induce tb.8 lntelle ct to make 
tbe proper interence. 
Conclusions are also present in tirst principles. 
In quibus Licientlla speculatlv~87 conclusionss virtute 
continentur in primis principiis. unde qui pertecte cog-
nosceret principia secundum totam suam virtutem, non opus 
haberet ut e1 concluaiones seorsUM pPOponeretur. Sed quia 
non omoe. qui cognosount principia sutticiunt considerare 
quidquid in prinoipiis virtute continetur, neoe.se 8st 
propter eos ut in acienti18 ex principiis conclusiones 
deducantur.21 
In speculative sciences, conclusions are virtuall1 present in tbe 
tirst principles. The man who knows tirst principles in the 
fullness ot their power does not have to draw conclusions. 
An example ~om the experience of the author ot the tbesis 
will again illustrate what is meant. In the speculative science, 
nUftibe~. It b is equal to zero, tben we bAve a "ealnumbsl-.. :«It 
neither a nor b 1s equal to zero, then W8 have a oomplex number 
~hicb is neither real nor imaginary. As a consequence, complex 
number 1. inclusive of both real and imaginarr number. 
21!.!., II-II, 44, 2 c. 
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philosophy, a tirst principle is "Act is not limited except by 
the potency in which it is received." The philosopher who tully 
understands this principle can draw several conclusions: pure 
aot must be totally unlimited, given the ditterence in levels ot 
being, e.g., plants, beasts, men, there must ba grades ot depen-
dance ot the actual principle on the potential; in all limited 
beings, there must be 80me distinction between potency and act. 
The philosopher, who adequately understands what aot, limit, and 
potenoy mean, can readily draw the above conolusions. Yet how 
are the conclusions present in th. principle? The man who tho-
roughly understands the principle has the power to draw the con-
clusions. In the understanding ot the principle, there is a dis-
position or determination to the oonclusions. In this the virtue 
consists. The understanding ot the principles is a tirst act 
trom which emanates a second act, the drawing of the conclusions. 
A final il18tance ot virtu. as power is the presence of a 
•• 
principal cause in the instrument. Saint Thomas explains the 
nature ot this virtual presence in the third part of the Summa in 
reply to a difficulty: 
Instrumentum habet duas actiones I unam instrumentalem, se-
cundum quam operatur non in virtute propria, sed in virtute 
prinoipal!s agential ali am autem habet actionem propriam, 
quae competi t sibi secundum propriam formam; sicut securi 
competit scinder. ratione suae acuitatls. !aeere ~uc.em lec-
tum inquantum est instrumentum artis.22 
In this passage the action of an instrument Which proceeds from 
22S.T •• III, 62, 1. ad 2. 
--
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its own substantial torm and that which p~ooeeds trom a power or 
external source are contrasted. A typewriter, for instance, is 
oapable of itself not even of making oertain impressions ~n papa~. 
Under the influenoe of a principal cause, however, it can compose 
a thesis. When the typewriter is printing a thesis, something is 
present over and above what it natural17 possesses. This some-
thing is the virtual presence or the principal cause. The prin-
cipal agent is not actually present; the author of the thesis 1s 
not a t1Pewr~.ter. Yet the agent is somehow there; he is virtually 
present by his power moving the typewriter to type the appropri-
ate Words. 
In a seoond text Saint Thomas amplifies this ideal 
Alio modo aliquid opers.tur ~d efteotum aliquem instruments.-
liter, quod quidem non operatur ad effeotum per formam sibi 
inhaerentem, sed solum in quantum est motum a par sa agent •• 
Haeo ent. est ratio instrumenti, in quantum est inatrumen-
tum, ut moveat motum: unde sicut se habet forma oompleta ad 
per se agentem, ita 8e habet motus quo movetur a principali 
agente, ad instrumentum, sicut serra operatur ad soamnum. Quamvi8 enim serra habeat aliquam actionem quae sibi compe-
tit secundum propriam formam, lit diVider., tamen aliquam 
affectum habet qui 8ibi non competit nisi in quantum est 
mota ab artifice, scilicet facere reotam incisionem, et 
oonvenientem forma. artis, et a10 instrumentum habet duas 
operationes: unam quae campetit ei secundum formam ppoppi-
am, aliam quae competit ei seoundum quod est motum a per se 
agents, quae transcendit virtutem propriae tormae.2l 
The essence of an instpument, Saint Thomas explains. is tnat it 
1s moved and moves simultaneously. A knite, for exanwle, by 
nature is a tool for cutting, in the hands of a surgeon, however, 
23B! !!t., 27, 4 c. 
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it becomes an instrument tor making a delicate incision in the 
human anatam,. Thus the surgical knife possesses two aspects in 
its performanoe. The tirat asp.ct is the outting which 1s natural 
to it, the second is the exoising diseased tissue, which belong. 
to it only beoause it 1s moved by the principal cause. The 
inat:Mmlent acts by reason ot both. its own power and that ot the 
principal cause. This latter power is over and beyond what the 
inatrument naturally possesses. Thus it baa a virtue.-. disposi. 
tion placed in the inatrument by the principal cause wbereby it 
achieve. sometbing beyond what it ia ordained to do by nature.24. 
There are several miscellaneous usag.s ot virts! by Saint 
Thomas. First, .ttects are present in their cause. virtually: 
"Roo aute. eat proprium Dei, ut sua •• aent1a ait immaterialiter 
comprebenaiva omnium, prout ettactus virtute pra •• x1stunt in oau-
s&."25 The cause oan alao be virtuallJ present in the etteot: 
"Aliquis actus dicitur durar. duplioiter: aut seoundum •••• nt1 .. ' 
aut •• oundum virtute. sive .ttectum auua •••• ~26 The en.uing 
illustration i. that ot a man throwing a rock. While he is aotu-
all,. throwing, the act endul'-es in its .s.enoel atter the rook 
24."ae)nf moved ,ua inatl'Ullent. however, i. p1'$cise11 tbat 
formalit!' o· he orea UP. aoiron wlieNby it transoends its own 
propep oapabilities." Francia X. Meehan, Effioient Oausality in 
Ax-istotl. and Saint Thomas (Waahington, D"a: datFiolio tfnlveJ:tsIi,. 
or AtIlep10a""1'Pe8s. 1(46), P. 299. 
2S~,,! •• I, ~, 2 o. 
261. IV Sent., 1S. ~, 2, sol. 3. 
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l.av.a tbe man'a hand, the act baa duPation ot virtue or erreot. 
Finally, vil'tua ia ocoaalonall,. used to aignltJ meaning: . "'Spi-
rl tus Sanetus. .. • • quantWi ad v1l'tute. vOcabulol'UDl • • • conve-
nt, tot1 Trln1tat1 •••• "21 Saint Thomaa 1s anawering an ob-
jection that tbe term Holy 8p11'1 t abould not be applied to tbe 
third person. but to the entlre Trinl t7. He anewer. that it we 
attend onl,. to the meanlns or tbe worda ...... ad Yirtut.. yooabulorumlt 
-.tben Hol,. 8p11-1t _,. reter to the entlre TriAit"'e 
Virtue, as signltJi.na the presence of an etfeot ln ita 
oa118., .. srnonomoua with etteot, and ... ind10ating meaning, Td.ll 
nov be anal7zed. An ettect is vl"uall,. present lnlts oause in 
tbe aenae tbat, al~ough it 408a not ,.et actuall,. exist. lt oan 
cOlle lnto existeno. throuab. tbe callae J the.. al"a4,. exiata in 
tbe cause a det.rmlnedrelat1onatbip betw •• n th. oaus. and tbe 
erteot tsbat can be produced, 'l!b.e oaus. llkewi •• perdurea acoord-
tng to .. virtual pH.ence in it. ettect,' that la, lta ettl01en' 
oauaa11t7 re-.1na operative atter 1t. cauaal operation baa oeaae4. 
The act1rl", ot tbe etrect 18 not to'al17 1nteUi31b1e except 1n 
teJ'J118 of tbe oauae, ttwa a determ1ne4 relationship exists between 
the ette.t and its oause, and tor tbi. reason ~ptus oan oooasion-
aU,. be a a1ftoDJll t01ft etteot. Pinall,., the meanina ot a vop4 ma,. 
be oalled ita yil'tue, the vooable haa tbe power to PPOyoke mean-
ing. Beeauae meaning can be inte1ftre4 from ttle word., a detinite 
27!! I Sent., 10, 1, 4, ad 1. 
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relationship can be aacertained between a word and its mean1ng, 
and an instance ot virtue i8 in evidence. 
PinallY', virtue oan be a a11lonJ'll tor peak ot powett. TMa 
u8age is summarlzed in tb. tamiliar detinition ot v1rtu. as "ulti-
_ in re de potentia." Saint Thomaa explains the -antns ot thia 
usage in tbe tollowing pasaase. 
Ad pr1m1 au~ manitestat1on .. d10it quod, a1 contingat 
aliquu rem poase in ali quid magnum, puta quoad aliquia 
bomo ambUlet per .entum stadia, aut poaa1 t i.vare aUqu04 
magn\UI pondue, aemper d.etel"l81naaua a1" 4eD0JII1:Da11W1 .Jua 
potentia per respectum ad pluriJaNa in quod potest, .lout 
d10tmua potentla. ~jQ. bomini. •••• quod pot •• t 1eYare 
pondu. oent_ talentorum, aut quod pot •• t ire pel' apatlum 
oentum stadiorum, quamvia po.att cane. parte. lntPa latam 
quantitatem oontenta., alquldem pot •• t in 14 quod super-
abundat • • • • 
Slc 191tBr patet quod l1le qui pote.t 1n ea quae ex-
oeliunt, ne.e.s. e.t quod poa.lt et1am in ea quae aunt 
int'l'a. puta al a11qu1. poteat port&n centum. talenta, po-
terit etiam porta".. duo, et .1 poteat iN per oentWl .tadia, 
pote.t ire per duo: .ed tamen vl:rtua .. e1 non attrlbuitur 
rd.l exoellentlae, ld.at, .eoundum 1d atten41 tur viPtua 
re1, quod e.t exoellentlas1mwD omnlum e01'\11ll in quae poteBt. 
Et boo e.t quod dioitu. in a11a tran.1atloae, vlrtue 
.at ulti.ua t:::ntiae, quia .o1110et virtuB rei det.im!Di~ur iiiundua ult In "quod pote.t. Et boo etlam babet locum 
in vi1'tutlb1l8 anima.: diol tur enim y1rtua humana, pel' quam 
hoao pot •• t in ld quod eat exoel1entiastmum ln operibu'a 
humania, 8cl11oet ln ope" quod eat seoundum 1'atlooe •• 2 
Tbe notion ot viEtM as 8ign1f71ng the peak ot a thing's power 
baa lts source in tbe taot tbat potentlalit,. ia described in te1"lU 
ot :ux1J1U118 and m,1n1mwu. Ttw.e, it a lUll ls ablato 11tt'ilbun-
dred pound weignt, hi. potential 1. determined as ,tbe oapaclt7'ot 
litting one hundred, and not tift1 pounda even though the latteJ' 
28!!! I h 9.!:.!! • .!l.!!!!4., 2S. n. 249. 
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is certainly t~ue. Oapability is designated in terms at the maxi-
mum a person can accomplish, in other words, oapability is desig-
nated in te~s ot its acme. 
This notion ot vi~tus as peak ot power, however, is not a 
tusage in accord wi tn tne essential meaning at th.e term. In tbe 
central text, Saint Thomas explains this usage: 
llla detinitio Philosoph! potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno 
modo materialiter, ut per virtutem inte1l1gamus id in quod 
virtus potest. quod est ulttmum inter ea in quae potentia 
potest, sicut virtus Gjus qui potest, terre centum libras, 
est in eo in quantum potest terre centum libras non in 
quantum terre potest aexaginta. Alio modo potest intelligl 
essentiallterJ et sic virtus dioitur ultimum potentia., 
quia de~ignat potentiae oomplementum, sive id per quod 
potentia campletur, ait aliud a potentia, sive non.29 
"Ultimum in re de potentia" can be understood in two ways. Firat, 
fi t can signify the peak at the oapabili ty at the virtue. A man 
~o can carry a certain weight is aaid to be able to carry that. 
~d not a lesser weight, even th.ough undoubtedly he could carry 
tbe lighter amount. Oapabilit;r is desoribed 1n terms ot maximum 
or limit. The phrase, "ultimum 1n re de potentia," corresponds 
~o the essential meaning otvirtus only it 1t 18 synonomous with 
completion ot a poterur1J but this meaning ot the phrase is not 
being disoussed here. 
The purpose in the tirst section ot the conclusion to the 
present chapter will be to olaritr and sabematize the meanings 
ot virtu. examined throughout the preceding pages ot this chapter. 
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The principal observation must be that the present chapter deals 
with a notion of virtue somewhat different from that studied in 
Chapters Two and Three~ Chapter Four examines instances ot virtus 
wbich a:re translations trom the Greek dJv«.u~ while the previous 
two chapters were concerned with usages which. had their origin in 
) ~ I 
the word Cfe.~7!l. The teN dUf#f<lJlI', as tl'anslated by virtua, had 
two meanings: (1) active potency, i.e., tne ability to do, 
(2) pasaive potenc,., i.e., an undergointb the capability ot com-
ing into aotualitYe !ranalatlon according to the firat meaning 
vaa a more frequent ocourrence aa subsequent analysis will show. 
The first section of the summary will discuss the meanings 
I 
of virtus which are translationa of r/Clf!'If.J,lII. The second part 
, 
will inquire wbather tbe usage. of virtus-4vm.uu t.t.re in any va., 
) I 
related to tbe uses of virtu8-"Yi¥'~ and theretore to the detini-
tion of virtue heretofore described as oentral. 
I 
Tbe usages ot virtus which translate c/UI'It.i(lJ can rougnl1 be 
olaasified in four oategories. Th.e first categor,. is that of the 
angela. Here the notion of active potenol predominates. Angels 
are denominated virtues beoause they have power to perform oper-
ations. Angels are called virtues in three senses, one general 
and two particular. In tbe general sens8, they are virtues 
because they operate as intermediaries between God and His uni-
verse.30 According to p.eudo-DdoDJsius, a particular order of 
66 
angels oan be oalled the Virtues sinoe their function is to pro-
vide a oapacity ready to operate.31 Acoording to Gregory the 
Great, another order deserves the name virtus because it has the 
task of working miracles.32 
, 
A seoond catego17' of virtus as d"YfV:{'1. includes the various 
virtual presences. There are, in general, three such presenoes, 
the first two of which combine both the active and passive mean-
ings ot JUY~MU, and a final ODe which specifies only the aotive 
sen.e. The first type of virtual pre.enoe i. that of elements in 
a oompound.3) In this type, virtus is discernible both in an 
aotive sense (the compound acts in ways appropriate to the ele-
ments) and in a passive ~ense (the element. can be educed from 
the potency of the matter of the compound). Seoondly, a oonclu-
sion is virtually present in the premises ot a syllogism34: from 
the viewpoint of the conclusion. it does not yet actual.ly exist, 
but it can, from the viewpoint of the premises, tney are inher-
ently capable of making the conclusion become actual. Finally, 
the presence of a principal cause in its instrument» is an in-
stance of active peteney only: the use of tne instrument becomes 
3l!.!., I, 108, Comp. Theel., I, 126. 
)2Ibid• 
33»8 Mixt. !!!me, >, !.!., I, 76, 4, ad 4. 
l4~ . .:l.2., 14, 11 e J ! . .!., II-II, 44, 2 e. 
3S~ !!E., 27, 4 CJ !.!., III, 62, 1, ad 2. 
... 
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a part 01' the action 01' the principal cause; i.e., the principal's 
ability is aotive in the instrument and therefore virtually 
present. 
I 
A number of usages of virtus as r&v;'4.l1J must be categorized 
as miscellaneous. The first pair 01' suoh usages bears a similar-
ity to the virtual presence of a oonclusion in its premises. An 
effect is present in its oauseJ6 according to a passive potency, 
it does not actually exist, but can come to exist through the 
cause. A cause remains present in its etteot37 according to its 
active potency: it can and does make the being of the effect 
actual. Two other miscellaneous usages of virtus as cltv"ulJ are 
virtue as indicative of meaning38 and as sJllonomous with mira-
018.39 I Both uses translate r:[YVIi.uIS in l"egard to passiVe potenoy. 
Virtue is equivalent to meaning inasmuoh as a meaning oan he drawn 
out 01' a word. Virtue likewise oan signify miraculous power inso-
tar as a miraou~ous work 1s present in a supernatural power and 
there tore can OOMe to be through that power. 
Finally. the category 01' virtul as the peak of potenoy40 
36S.T., I, 84, 2 c. 
--
37!n IV ~., 15, 4, 2, sol. 3. 
i~In I ~., 10, 1, 4, ad 1, !.1., I, 29, 4 OJ !a!2., 36, 
391.1., II-II, 178, 1, ad 3. 
401n I De Cael. et Mund., 2$, n. 249J ~., nne 2$1-2J In 
I !!!!'!i.,-a, ~. I, ad r. - -
68 
must be considered. Virtue as peak of power indicates the over-
all capability of an active potency_ 
In almost all the usages of virtus as dJvlI{gu. virtue con-
notes active potency, the ability to do; in a few, undergoing or 
passive potency is discernible. In terms or causality, the type 
ot cause in question tor the usages discussed in the present 
chapter is efficient cause. How then are these usages related to 
those discussed in Chapters Two and Three where the notion of 
formal causality predominated? The second halt of the summary 
will examine whether any relationship exists. 
In Chapters Two and Three, virtus was diseositio perfecti 
ad optimum. The diseositio is a formal determination; it is a 
first act. Perfecti indicates that which. possesses this formal 
disposition, an operative potency. oetimum finally indicates 
tormal disposition to proper activity or second act. Furthermore 
the most common usage of virtu. by Saint Thomas is virtue as a 
habit. A habit, it will be recalled, is something over and above 
the nature ot the faculty. Human faculties are open to all being, 
a habit supnlements these faculties and specializes their determi-
nation to being. Thus trom the general notion of virtus and its 
most common usage, two interences can be made: (1) virtue is a 
determination to second act; (2) virtue frequently is something 
over and beyond the nature of a power. On the basis of these 
inferences the seoondary usages are derived. 
Virtus can be applied to angels sinoe anY' angel is an inter-
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mediate between essence and operation.4l Virtue as a habit is 
something which is superadded to the essence ot the subject power 
and with it determines operation. The term can also be applied 
to two orders ot angels. It can be applied to one order since 
its task is to provide a capablllt, read, to act.42 The presence 
01" virtue alwa,s indicates that the power is tully determined and 
consequent11 prepared to act. It can be applied to a second 
order since they have the power 01" working miracles.43 The, have 
a power over and beyond nature. 
It is legitimate to speak 01" three types ot virtual presence, 
Elements are virtually present in a compound, the elements deter-
mine the properties and modes ot operation ot the compound.44 
Thus the torms of the elements determine the second acts ot the 
compound although in & modified torm. Conclusions are virtual11 
present in the prinoiples tram Which tne1 are drawn, understand-
ing of the principles begets drawing 01" the oonclusions.4S In 
the understanding ot the principles is the determination to a 
second act (here in a logical, not an ontological sense), the 
drawing 01" the conclusion. Finalll," principal cause is virtu-
411_1., I, 108, S, ad 1. 
4ZAccording to tne acneme ot pseudo-Dion1sius. 
108, OomE. Theol., I, 126. 
43According to tne scheme ot Gregory. ~. 
44D8 Mtxt. Elem., SI S.T., I, 16, 4, ad 4. 
-- ---
4Sne ~., ~, 11 CJ !_!., II-II, 44. 2 c. 
S.T., I, 
--
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alll present in tbe instrument.46 Tn. instrument possesses a 
capabilltJ over and above what 1s natural to it, this PQwer is 
the virtual presence ot the principal. cause. 
There are numerous miscellaneous meanings ot virtus: lt 
can indio ate the presence ot anettect in a cauae47 and be aynono-
mous with ettect,48 meanlng,49 o:r miracle.SO The explanation how 
the.e usages a:re related to the detinition proposed as central is 
at beat bJpothetloal .ince Saint Thoma. do._ not provide any 
explicit anall_e. ot tbes. instanoes. In tbe inatances ot an 
.tteot in its cause and ot a cause in 1ta etteot, a dete~1ned 
relationship or disposition does exist between the two terms ot 
tbe operation. the ettect, prior to ita being actual, is present 
in it. cause in a state that exceeds pure potentialitl. and the 
oau.e perdures in its ettect in a manner tbat i. real, yet no 
longer identitiable with tbe aotual exercise ot it. etticient 
oauaalit,. Thus a disposition ot a tirst aot (oause) t9 its 
second aot (etteot) is discoverable, but this relationship ot 
tirst to seoond act is not in accord with the approp:riate usage 
ot the two terma. virtue, bovever, mal be said to be vindioated 
46l)e .!!! •• 27, It. C J !.I •• III. 62, 1, ad 2. 
47~.! •• I, ~, 2 o. 
4.8!! IV !!!1l., lS, 4, 2, sol. 3. 
491ft I Sent., 10, 1, 4, ad 1, S.T., It 29, 4. 0, _Ibid., )6, 
1, ad 1.-- --
SO!.!., II-II, 178, 1, ad l. 
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in an analogous sense. Meaning and virtue can be synonyms. A 
word possesses a power to convey meaning. This power can be 
called a virtus since the word as a subject possesses a capacitl 
whereby it produces a second act, its meaning. Again the terms 
of the central detinition are verified in analogous senses. Last 
ot all, a miracle may be called a virtue because it is an occur-
rence which is over and belond nature. Habits determine their 
subject powers over and beyond the natural endowments ot the 
powers. Since miracles, like habits, are over and beyond nature, 
they are virtues. 
Finalll, virtus can mean the peak ot a thing's power.51 
This usage is acceptable it understood materiall,$2; the maximum 
or minimum indicates precisely what the virtue ot a thing is. 
This usage, however, does not catch the essential meaning; virtue 
18 a formal determination to operation whether or not the opera-
tion works to full capacit, or not. 
SlIn I De Oae1. et Kund., 25, n. ~9J Ibid., nne 2$1-2. In 
I !!!l.,~, ~ !;'Qd r. - - -
$2ne Vir. in Cam., 1, ad 6. 
---- --
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This tinal chapter will be composed of three parts. First, 
the oentral definition, dis2ositio perfeoti ~ optimum, will be 
disoussed--what the definition means in its entirety and what 
each individual term signities. Secondly. an attempt will be 
made to classify the several usages of virtus. Here attention 
will be given to the question whetb.er the subjeot term is predi-
cated analogously, univacally. or equivocally in the writings ot 
Aquinas. Thirdly and tinally, the already posed question whether 
the use at virtue to signify habit bas a primacy in the mind ot 
Aquinas will be inVestigated. 
The tirst oonolusion at this studJ is that dispositio eer-
teeti ~ oetimum 1s the essential definition ot virtue. It has 
been translated as "the tOPmal determination ot an operative 
potency to its proper activity."l Diseositio is the formal 
determination. It is a first act relative to a second; virtue is 
essentially a determination to another act. Yet after careful 
reflection upon the uses of virtus discussed in the previous 
chapters, the inevitable conclusion is that dis20s1tio assumes 
lot. above, p. 19. 
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manifold meanings. 
This ~ormal determination can be identified withtheidivine 
essence. It cm1 also be identified with the nature of finite 
beings in the instanceot natural potencies. It can be a proper 
acoident such as agent intellect, it can be a further determina-
tion of an acoident such as a habit. It can be identified with 
the disposition of potency for existence. It can be the determi-
nation of an act o~ understanding premises leading to a further 
act o~ conoluding. It can likewise be the totalit7 o~ a personal 
being's powers as it i8 in the case ot the angelic virtues. The 
central notion ot determination pervades all these instanoes of 
virtus; not in all cases, however, is the dispositio a formal 
determination. 
Per~eotl indicates the subject of the formal determination, 
it is usually an operative potenc7. Again usage provides a wider 
range of meaningstol" the tex-m. The subject of virtue can be the 
all-perfeot. tbe divine essence. It oan be a finite nature, it 
can be an accidental pel"tection like the agent intellect, the 
possible intellect, or the will. The perfeotum C&.ll be a non-
operative poteno7. in the case ot the virtus ot pOtene7 to being. 
It can also be a substance, as it ia in the case of the presence 
of elements in a oompound or ot principal oause in an instrument. 
Th.e pertectum can be an act ot understanding, it <lan be &nangel. 
In all cases the notion ot subject is verified, most otten tne 
subject is an operative potane1_ 
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Finally, virtus is !8 optimum. Tbe optimum is the aotivity 
proper to the subJeot; moat often it is a seoond aot. Yet oetimum 
can quite properly reter to the operation ot God. Also it oan 
indioate the aot ot existenoe or the act ot living, i.e., first 
aot. It sometimes signities a miraoulous aot. Most often, of 
course, it is a second aot. an aot ot sensing, understanding, 
willing, an angelic operation, the influence ot properties on the 
operations of a oompound. Oooasionally it is a single aspeot of 
an operative aot, as in the case of principal and instrumental 
oauses. Finally, o:etimum may be a temporally seoond aot, as it 
is when it signifies an aot of concluding subsequent upon a prior 
aot ot understanding. In all oases the notion of aotivit7 domi-
ates, usuallJ oRtlmum means seoond aot or operation. 
Thus disposl tio :eerfeoti:, ~ optimum Is tbe eS8ential defi-
nItion of virtus. In the fullnes8 of its meaning it signifies 
nthe formal determination ot an operative potenoy tor its proper 
aotiv1t7_" In aotual usage, however, virtul otten means "the 
determination ot a subjeot to aotivit,.." 
A seoond task to be aocomplished in this ohapter is the 
classification of the usages of virtu. by Saint Thomas. A dis-
tinction oan be drawn between primar,. and seoondary usages. The 
justifioation tor this distinction is twotold. First, the olassi-
tication ot the virtues in the oentral text is the most compre-
hensive set ot oategories oftered by Saint Thomas. Secondly, as 
11 be shown, the primar,- usages more olosely adhere to the 
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meaning of the essential detinition ot virtus. The primary usages 
are those trom the classification given in the central text. The 
secondary uses are those which tall outside the above classifi-
cation. 
The primal"Y' usages are threetold. There are the virtues of 
the totally active potencies. Examples ot this type are the 
divine power, the agent intellect, and tne natural potencies. A 
second type are tne virtues of the purely passive potencies. 
Example. are the sense taculties While they are actually being 
determined by their objects to aot. Finally, there are the vir-
tuea ot habituated potenciea. The intellectual and moral virtues 
are examples ot this twe. 
There are numel'OUS secondary usages. First, thel'e are the 
virtues ot potency to being. Secondly. angels can be oalled vir-
tues in three senses t all angels when designated under this name 
are regarded as intermediaries between essence and operation, 
one order ot angels has oharge ot providing a faoulty tully read1 
to act, another order works miraoles. Thirdly, the" are a.veral 
types ot virtual presenoe I elements are virtually contained in 
compounds, a conolusion is tound virtuall,. in its premises, the 
principal cause is vinuall,. present in its instrument, an eftect 
reaides vi:rtuall1 in its cause. Fou:rtbly, a miracle oan be 
called a virtue. Fitthly, virtue can be equated with peak of 
power. Final!'1, virtue can be a sJllonrm tor meaning or e:ttect. 
There are two other meanings which will not be classitied 
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since their usage is rejected by Saint Thomas as improper. Vir-
tue oan be synonomous with object or with aot. 
In this context, it will be suitable to disouss whether 
virtue is predicated univocally, equivooally, or analogously in 
the works of Aquinas. It is the conclusion of this study that 
the te~ 1s predicated analogously. In each instance there 1s 
both similarity and dissimilaritY' in the manner in which the term 
is used. 
In the case of the primary usages. they have this in common 
that in each case virtus is a tormal disposition to operation. 
T r 
They ditfer according to the relation between the determination 
and its subject. For the total11 active potenci.s, the formal 
detel'nlination and the subject are identified permanently. For 
sense in act, both the tOl'Il1&l determination and the subject are 
united. but only transientl,.. Finally, in the case 01' a habit. 
the virtue is a pertection superadded to the poteney and residing 
in it. In each case the relationship between determination and 
subject ditfers depending on whether they are united, either per-
manently or transiently. and whether the determination is an 
abiding disposition 01' the subject or not. In all oases, the 
virtue is a tormal determination to operation whether this opera-
tive act has ita origin in God or in another being, living. sen-
sitive, intellectual, or volitional. 
Among the sGconda17 usages 01' vlrtua. the analogy takes two 
torms. In the tirst, the similarity consists in the fact that 
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the virtue in eve~ instance complies with part of the oentral 
detinition, usually determination to activity. Among these usa-
ge. the dissimilarity arises from the taot that either the sub-
ject of the virtue is not an operative potencf or the activit1 is 
not second aot. Ex.amples trom this categorf are the virtues ot 
potencY' to being, angels (in the classification ot Saint Gregorl 
the Great) ,all types ot virtual presence, and peak ot power. 
Seoondly, the analogy is otten baaed on a similarity to either at 
the most frequent usages of virtus, as power or habit, even t~ough 
there might be great dissimilarity in terms ot the esssntial 
definition. Instanoes ot this oategory are miracles, angels in 
general or, acoording to pseudo-Diony.ius, meaning and effeot. 
Each of the seoondaJ7 usages then is both similar and dis-
similar to the oentral notion ot virtu.. Potenoy to being has a 
disposition tor an aotivit1' but this aotivity is tirst act and 
the subjeot is not an operative potenoy. Angels oan bear three 
possible similarities to the oentral notiont the, can mediate 
between essence and operation as a habit does, the'1 provide a 
facultJ prepared tor operation, they oan possess the power at 
working miracles, a power exceeding natural capabilit, (an habi-
tuated power exceeds the natural oapability). In eaoh case toe 
angelic vi~tues possess tnese dissimilarities to the central 
notion ot virtue I the determination represents the adequac)? ot 
their powers to operate; and the subject 1s a nature and not just 
his operational capabilities. For the elements in a compound or 
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tor the principal oause in an instrument, the virtue is a formal 
determination to the proper operation ot the elements or ot tr~ 
prinoipal agent. Yet in each ease, the determination no longer 
pertects its natural subject but another, the compound or the 
instrument. The virtual presence ot a conolusion in its premis •• 
oonsist. in the tact that in the aot ot understanding the prin-
oiples there is a determination to a seoond act, drawing the con-
olusion. The sequenoe, however, is logioal and not ontological. 
Likewise the ettect resides in its cause inasmuoh as the cause 
bas the power to produce the eftect and qua cause is a subjeot 
determined to the .tfect, the etfect, however, whioh 1s the 
object of the determination, is not the seoond act of the cause. 
A miracle bears a resemblance to a habit, it exoeeds the capacity 
ot natUl"e. The miraole, however, is not a tormal determination 
to operation, but an etfect of the operation. Virtue as a peak 
of power indicates the maximum determination ot a potency, 7et 
peak ot power only desoribe. the determination, it doe. not 
direot17 signify it. Meaning and ettect bear a likeness to a 
prinoipal usage ot virtu!_ power. The meaning or a word is its 
power to evoke understanding, the duration ot an act acoording to 
its etteet is indicative that the power continues even though the 
act has ceased. Neither usage is a determination ot a potency. 
Finally. there i. the questLon whether virtue as a habit is 
to be accorded a certain primacy in the writings ot Saint Thomas. 
There are ~o reasons that tavor such an interpretation. First, 
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all the texts concerning virtue in general are in the context ot 
virtue as a habit. Secondly. numerous secondary usages have 
their derivation trom the central notion in their similarity to 
virtue as a habit: they are something over and above the nature 
ot a potency. And yet there are three objeotions to this primacy 
tor habitual virtue. Even though Saint Thomas always discussed 
the general notion in oonneotion with this partioular type, ha' 
never makes any explicit mention of such a primacy. Seoondly, 
there are additional derived usages which have their basis' in the 
general notion ot virtus or in their similarity to virtue as 
power. Finally, there oan be no question ot a metaphysical pri-
macy to be accorded virtue as a habit because, 1n line with tne 
rest of his metapoysical thought, Saint Thomas would find the 
divine virtue as the prtmary analegate ot all other virtue •• 
How then are the contexts ot the central texts to be ex-
plained? It an attempt is made to reflect upon the opportunities 
available to Saint Thoma. to discuss virtus in general, pe~hap. a 
mo~e suitable explanation ot the contexts will evolve. In dis-
cussions of the presenoe of elements in a compound, virtue was an 
adequate solution to a vexing problem, Wb1 the p~ope~ties of a 
compound were somewhat similap to the p1"ope~tles ot the elements 
in a free state. The investigation, however, concerned the rela-
tion ot a compound and its elements. When the virtual presence 
ot a principal cause in its instrument was being treated, the 
principal tocus was on tne nature of dual causality. Viptue was 
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onl1 an apt term to describe the relationship ot the two causes. 
In treatises on angels, virtue was merell a name to be applied to 
all or to a particular order; the contexts were bardl,. suitable 
fol' discussing vlr'tu~ in general. FinaU,.. whenever virtue is 
used as s.,nol\J1'!lOus with th.e divine power, the age.nt intellect, 
tbe natural potencies, etc., the subject tor discussion is not 
vil'tus 'but the Nal! t7 so named. 
In tbe cas. ot virtue as a habit, however, a difterent slt-
~ation prevailed. The term virtus vas being us.d as such. Given 
the opportunitl to discours8 on virtue as such, Saint Thomas then 
proceeds to render an explanation ot what virtue in general is. 
rt'bereason whJ all the dl.cuasions ot virtue in general appear in 
th&oontext ot habl tual virtue 1s that virtue as a bab! t 1s the 
onll suitable context tor disoussing tbe ,8neral notion. Wherever 
e18e Saint Thomas discus8ed virtue, tbe topio ot tbe di.cusslon 
was not virtue as such, anl treatment ot tbe general notion would 
there tore bave been misleading. 
A comparison can be drawn between the articl •• which con-
cern virtue in seneral and the initial articl. ot al Pgt!9t1a.2 
The oi tedvol'k, 11k."~ Vll'tut~~us!! Oommuni, has a deceptive 
title. R! Potentia i. a treati.e not on p.otenol as suoh, but on 
tbe divine power. The prooedure amplored. bowever, 1s. similar to 
that ot the texts on virtue. Betore be treats the topic tOI' 4i8-
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cussion, Saint Thomas examines the notion of Rotentia in general. 
From the general he proceeds to the particular notion which is 
the subject of the study. So it 18 with the discusslons of vir-
tue. Aquinas first investigates the general significance of th.e 
term even tbough a particular meaning is proper11 the matter at 
hand. 
Two further arguments can be adduce d in support of t he con-
tention tbat no primacy i. to be aceorded virtue as a babit. 
First, virtue in this sense 1s not the most frequent usage ot 
virtu8 b7 Saint Thomas. Schutz in his '1'homas-Lex1kon catalogued 
oyep a hundred ditterent types 01' uses of virtus IS the proximate 
principle 01' aotivity against about tifty diftePent t1pes ot vir-
tue in the .ense ot a babit.) Seoondly, a parallel can be drawn 
between Saint Thomas f. day and our own. It a contemporarJ phi-
losopher wanted to discus. the general meaning ot the term, !it-
tue, be would do 80 in tbe context ot virtue as opposed to vice, 
-
sinoe this meaning is the one oommonly associated with the word. 
As a consequence, the modern would also discuss virtue in general 
in oonjunction with virtue as a babit even though Webster's Dic-
tionary lists several other ourrent meanings ot the term.' 
3Schutz, PP. 8S2-7 & 8,9-64. 
4t'VIRTUE • • • • 1. pl. One ot the orders ot angels. 2. 
Moral practice or action, moral excellenoe, reotitudeJ morality. 
3. A partioular moral $xcellenoe; any moral quality conceived as 
a good, also, such virtues collectively •••• 4. Active quality 
or power, power adequate to tbe production ot a given etteot, 
potency, efficacy. as, a medicine without virtue, also, a partio-
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As a result, it is the oonolusion ot this study that vir-
tue as a habit has no pFimaoy among the usages by Aquinas ot ]it-
tus. The context ot the general disoussions is to be explained 
-
in terms ot a praotical exigenoy, virtue as a habit was the only 
suitable occasion tor Saint Thomas to discuss virtue in general. 
Virtus then in the writings ot Saint Thomas Aquinas is 
essentially defined as di8P08itio perrecti ~ opti~. It is 
directly a tormal determination. This formal determination is a 
perfection ot a potency. It is also essentially relative, it is 
determination to some type ot activity. There are pr1mary usages 
ot virtus such as the divine power, the agent intelleot, the 
natural potencies, and habits. There are secondary usages 8uch 
as the virtue of potency to being, angel, miracle, peak of power, 
and virtual presence which are less preoisely conneoted with the 
essential meaning. When the tem is used, it is predicated 
analogously. 
ular instance of suoh virtue, as, the virtue or a given remedJ. S. Hanll strength or courage, valor. 6. EXcellence or an excel-
lenoe ot any kind, as, to make a virtue of nece.sity. 7. Obaa-
tity, esp., the cnastity of women •• -In, or Bz virtue ot. Through 
the toroe ot, by authority or." Webster's Iewbolt.sIite Dic-
tionarl' 2nd ed. (Springfield: C. &; d. I'Eirrlam do., ~>4 r;-
p. 4;3 • 
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